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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
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COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL: 
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICYt 
Hugh Alan Ross* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
A NUMBER of recent events makes it timely to reconsider certain aspects of the relation between psychiatry and the law. In 
the past decade, both the public and the legal profession have 
been increasingly concerned with the impact of mental illness on 
the law. In 1952, an outstanding text, Psychiatry and The Law, 
was published as the joint effort of a lawyer and a psychiatrist.1 
Two years later the Durham case laid down a new test of insanity 
in criminal cases, rejecting the M'Naghten rule.2 Interest in the 
case resulted in a host of law review articles, symposiums, and a 
book on insanity and criminal responsibility.3 In the tort area, 
there is a clear trend toward recognition of mental suffering as a 
legitimate element of damages, either with or without preceding 
trauma.4 Another example is the recent Bailey case, a landmark 
decision in workmen's compensation law.5 The court said that even 
though a statute defined "injury" as "harm to the physical struc-
ture of the body," work-connected mental illness is compensable, 
since the body is a single interrelated functioning organism which 
includes the mind. 
In the area of hospitalization and treatment, it is now generally 
tThis article is a part of a dissertation submitted to ithe Faculty of The University of 
Michigan Law School in partial fulfillment of the xequirements for the S.J.D. degree.-Ed. 
•Associate Professor of Law and University Counsel, Western Reserve University.-Ed. 
1.Manfred Guttmacher and Henry Weihofen. 
2-Durham v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 862. 
3 BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw OF HOMICIDE (1955). Symposiums 
on Law and Psychiatry may be found in 4 KAN. L. REv. 349 (1956); 45 KY. L.J. 215 (1957); 
14 Omo ST. L.J. 117 (1953); and 29 TEMP. L.Q. 380 (1956). 
4 Recent cases are collected in comment, 6 WEST. REs. L. iREv. 384 (1955). 
5 Bailey v. Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W. (2d) 315 (1955), noted, 53 
MICH. L. REv. 898 (1955). See also: LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §42.20 (1952), 
and GUTIMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw, chapters 3 and 7 (1952). 
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recognized that mental illness is the nation's number one public 
health problem. In 1949, the last year for which reliable statistics 
are available, 390,567 patients were admitted to mental hospitals.6 
Of these, 85 percent were admitted to public hospitals. At the 
end of 1949, there were 663,115 patients listed on the books of 
mental hospitals ( either as resident patients or on conditional 
release) and over 98 percent were accounted for by the state 
hospitals.7 These patients occupy about one-half of all available 
hospital beds. Despite recent developments in the use of the 
tranquilizing drugs, the statistics are about the same today as 
they were in 1949.8 
Mental illness wastes money as well as lives. The direct cost 
of mental illness is borne almost entirely by the state governments, 
as this is one of the few important state functions which receive 
no federal grants-in-aid. The state hospital systems are one of 
the "big four" with respect to total state expenses; these are 
education, highways, social welfare, and mental hospitals, in that 
order. Although every state requires patients in state hospitals 
to pay for their care if able, less than ten percent of state hospital 
maintenance costs are recovered from patients. The state govern-
ments spend approximately $600 million annually for capital 
and operating costs of mental hospitals,9 and the annual wage 
loss attributable to mental patients has been estimated at $1,750,-
000,000.10 One of the most important and least recognized indirect 
costs of mental illness is the tremendous volume of industrial 
accidents caused by mentally ill workers who are accident prone. 
It has been estimated that ten percent of the labor force is respon-
sible for 7 5 percent of the accidents, and that a substantial por-
tion of these suffer from anxiety or hysteria neuroses.11 
6 U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, PATIENTS IN MENTAL !NSrITUTIONS-1949, p. 22, Pub. 
No. 233 (1952). 
7Ibid. 
s This does not mean that the tranquilizers are ineffective. The total volume of 
cases remains the same, but the period of hospitalization has been reduced and more 
people are able to obtain psychiatric care because of the increased turnover. Silverstein, 
"Psychology, Mental Illness, and the Law," 60 W. VA. L. REv. 55 at 61-63 (1957). 
9COUNCIL OF STATE GoVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES: 1954-55, p. 298 (1954); 
COUNCIL OF STATE GoVERNMENTS, REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE-THE MENTAL 
HEALTH PROGRAMS OF THE FORTY-EIGHT STATES 107 (1950) [hereinafter cited REPORT TO 
GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE]; U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, PUB. No. 233, Table 19 (1952). 
10 NATIONAL AssoCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH, FAcrs AND FIGURES 3, 9 (1952). 
11 James and Dickinson, "Accident Proneness and Accident Law," 63 HARV. L. REv. 
769 (1950). 
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A. Recent Developments in the Legal Aspects of Hospitalization 
During the past ten years, legislatures throughout the country 
have been concerned with the mentally ill and the role of the 
state in their care and treatment. The critical nature of the 
problem has been recognized by both Congress12 and the states. 
At the state level this concern has resulted in a number of recent 
substantial revisions of both the organizational structure of the 
mental hospital systems and the commitment statutes. 
There has been some disagreement as to the desirability of 
uniform legislation among the states in respect to the hospitaliza-
tion of the mentally ill. The American Bar Association Special 
Committee on the Rights of the Mentally Ill concluded that the 
subject of commitment does not lend itself with advantage to a 
uniform state law, as few problems in the field are projected 
beyond state boundaries.13 Other writers have not hesitated to 
make detailed recommendations for uniform legislation.14 The 
impact of commitment on legal capacity to sell or contract, which 
affects interstate trade, the increased mobility of our population, 
the increased incidence of multi-state property holding, and the 
increased number of U.S. Veterans Administration patients, most 
of whom are committed under state statutes, all indicate a greater 
need for uniformity. 
The most important stimulus to uniformity occurred in 
June 1949 when the Governors' Conference asked the Council 
of State Governments to prepare a detailed report on state 
programs for the care of the mentally ill. The research report, 
together with forty specific recommendations, was returned 
to the Governors' Conference in June of 1950.15 At about the 
same time, a working committee was formed in the Federal Se-
curity Agency, at the request of the National Advisory Mental 
12 The National Mental Health Act was passed in 1946. 60 Stat. 421, 42 U.S.C. (1952) 
§§201-246. The act authorized federal grants-in-aid to the states for research and educa-
tion in the area of preventive mental health. No direct grants are made to the state 
mental hospital system. Passage of the act has done much to arouse interest in mental 
hygiene programs among the states and has resulted in a number of states revising the 
administrative structure of the state mental hospitals. See REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS' 
CONFERENCE 82. 
13 73 A.B.A. 'REP. 287 (1948). 
14 See, for example, the quite specific recommendations of the Medical Director of 
the U.S. Public Health Service: KEMPF, LAws PERTAINING TO THE ADMISSION OF PATIENTS 
TO MENTAL HOSPITALS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, U.S. Public Health Reports, 
Supp. No. 157, p. 28 (1944). 
15 REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE. 
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Health Council, and was asked to draft a model commitment 
act to implement the recommendations of the Governors' Report. 
The work of the committee culminated in the transmittal in 
September 1950 of a draft act to all of the state govemors.16 By 
the end of 1957, ten states had adopted the Draft Act in whole 
or in part. · 
The Draft Act was not designed as a uniform act, but it is 
intended as an aid to states which are considering revision of 
existing statutes. The President of the National Association for 
Mental Health stated: 
" ... nobody asserts that the Act is perfect or that all of its 
provisions will satisfy the needs and circumstances of any 
particular State. The Act is presented by the Federal Security 
Agency as a working model, to be adapted to local need and 
conditions and to be drawn upon for suggestions by those re-
sponsible for legislation in each of the States of the Union."17 
Unfortunately, the newest and most complete survey of the 
legal aspects of mental illness has not yet been published. This 
is the Project on the Rights of the Mentally Ill, one of the first 
research surveys conducted by the recently established American 
Bar Foundation. The study is comparative in nature and sur-
veys the statutes, regulations, and cases in all of the states and 
territories: 
"The Foundation's survey of the law of mental illness is the 
most comprehensive examination of this topic to be under-
taken in this country or abroad, and encompasses all major 
civil and criminal law areas relating to mental illness. The 
special contribution of the Foundation project to mental 
illness law may therefore be in the fact that it proposes to deal 
with the whole area in an integrated manner. No such evalu-
ation of the interrelationships among all phases of the law 
has ever been attempted."18 
While uniform legislation may be desirable, it is not essential. 
16A DRAFr Acr GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY !LL, U.S. PUBLIC 
HEALTH SERVICE, PUBLICATION No. 51, rev. ed. (1952) [hereinafter :referred to as the Draft 
Act]. A brief summary of the act, by one of its authors, is set forth in Felix, "Hospitaliza-
tion of the Mentally Ill," 107 AM. J. PsYClilATRY 712 (1951). Unless expressly stated 
otherwise, all references in this article are to ithe 1952 revised edition of the Draft Act 
rather than to the original 1951 edition. Both published editions include a commentary 
by the draftsman of the act, hereinafter :referred to as "Author's Commentary." 
11 Draft Act at vii (1951). 
18 Kittrie, "Justice for the Mentally Ill," 41 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 46 at 48 (1957). 
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What is important is that state legislatures understand the prob-
lems involved in compulsory commitment, recognize the complex 
relationship that exists between the commitment statutes and 
other legal aspects of mental illness, and take advantage of the 
experience of those states which have recently adopted the Draft 
Act or other comprehensive commitment statutes.19 
B. Terminology 
When a mental patient is "arrested" by a "sheriff" armed 
with a "warrant," "charged" as a person "accused of insanity" 
and after "trial" committed to an "institution" as an "inmate," 
it is not hard to see why the terminology used acts as an emotional 
shock which may seriously hinder treatment and recovery. Most 
of the states have modernized the terminology of commitment in 
the past twenty years, although too many states retain a distinct 
criminal flavor in their statutes.20 
The modern statutory terminology varies from state to state. 
In this paper language is used as follows: 
(1) The term "mental illness" is used here and in most modern 
statutes rather than the older terms "insanity," "lunacy" or "un-
soundness of mind." "Mental illness" as used by psychiatrists re-
fers generally to any type or degree of mental unbalance or per-
sonality disorder. Although "insanity" was formerly used to mean 
any serious mental illness, it is now generally used to refer to the 
degree of mental illness which excuses criminal responsibility. 
19 For those states which contemplate revision of their statutes, one of the best 
sources of information consists of the research repor,ts of some of the states which have 
recently overhauled their •hospitalization statutes. One of the most valuable Teports is 
that of the ll.LINOIS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, COMMITMENT TO MENTAL HOSPITALS, Pub. No. 
52 (1942). The recommendations of the Council were finally adopted as the Mental 
Health Code of 1951, m. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 91½, See also KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES IN ,KANSAS, Parts I and II, Pub. Nos. 143 and 145 (1946); MICHIGAN 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 13th Annual Report, Part II (1943), and 14th Annual Report, Part I 
(1944); MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE REsEARCH COMMI'ITEE, CARE AND 'TREATMENT OF MENTAL 
PATIENTS, Pub. No. 19 (1948); WISCONSIN JOINT INTERIM COMMI'ITEE ON REvlSION OF THE 
PUBLIC WELFARE LAws, GENERAL COMMENT (1947)-published as a series of footnotes to 
Wis. Stat. (1947) c. 51, and in Wis. Stat. Ann. (West, 1957). Foreign experience in dealing 
with mental illness is also available. See the recently published report of the Royal 
Commission on ,the Law relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, 1954-1957 
(1957. H,M.S.O.), commented on in 21 Moo. L. ·REY. 63 (1958); and FOURTH REPORT oF THE 
ExPERT COMMI'ITEE ON MENTAL HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Technical Reports 
Series No. 98 (1955). 
20 For discussions of terminology in commitment statutes, see REPORT TO GoVERNORS' 
CONFERENCE 47; comment, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 at 1181 (1947). 
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"Incompetency" is used to refer to that degree of mental illness 
which renders the individual unable to take care of his property 
and justifies the appointment of a guardian. Unfortunately, there 
is no term which refers to the degree of mental · illness which 
justifies either voluntary or compulsory hospitalization. A few 
writers have used "commitability" but the term seems clumsy 
and has not gained acceptance. Partly because of this confusion 
in terminology, and partly because human minds can not be 
measured in pounds or feet, the states have had a great deal of 
difficulty in defining the degree of mental illness which justifies 
hospitalization. 
Some states have used the term "mental illness" in the defini-
tion section of the statute in a general sense and in later provisions 
attempted to spell out the degree of mental illness which is re-
quired to commit a person to a mental hospital. For example, 
the Wisconsin statute provides: "51.001. Definitions. As used in 
this chapter: (1). Mental illness is synonymous with insanity .... "21 
A later section provides that the patient must be both mentally ill 
and "a proper subject for custody and treatment."22 
The Draft Act also provides a general definition plus a more 
detailed provision for the degree of illness which justifies hospital-
ization. The act provides: 
"Section 1. Definitions.-As used in this Act, terms shall have 
the following meanings: 
(a) Mentally ill individual.-An individual having a psy-
chiatric or other disease which substantially impairs his men-
tal health. "23 
A later provision states that compulsory hospitalization for 
an indeterminant period can be ordered by a court if the court 
finds that the proposed patient: 
"(I) is mentally ill, and 
(2) because of his illness is likely to injure himself or others 
if allowed to remain at liberty, or 
(3) is in need of custody, care or treatment in a mental hos-
pital and, because of his illness, lacks sufficient insight 
or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to 
his hospitalization. "24 
21 Wis. Stat. (1957) §51.001. 
22 Id., §51.02(5)(c). 
23 Draft Act, §1. 
24 Id., §9(g). 
1959] COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL 951 
On the other hand, some states define "mental illness" so as 
to include the conditions which must be met before hospitaliza-
tion is required. For example, New York and Pennsylvania define 
the term as follows: 
"§2. Definitions. When used in this chapter, unless otherwise 
e~pressly ~tated, or unless the context or subject matter other-
WISe requires, . . . 
(8) A 'mentally ill person' means any person affiicted with 
mental disease to such an extent that for his own welfare or 
the welfare of others, or of the community, he requires care 
and treatment .... "211 
"§1072. Definitions. As used in this act, unless the context 
clearly indicates otherwise, the following words and phrases 
shall have the following meanings: . . . (11) 'Mental illness' 
shall mean an illness which so lessens the capacity of a person 
to use his customary self-control, judgment and discretion in 
the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it 
necessary or advisable for him to be under care. The term 
shall include 'insanity,' 'unsoundness of mind,' 'lunacy,' 'men-
tal disease,' 'mental disorder,' and all other types of mental 
cases, but the term shall not include 'mental deficiency,' 'epi-
lepsy,' 'inebriety,' or 'senility,' unless mental illness is super-
imposed. "26 
None of the above definitions is really adequate and some have 
"been severely criticized as vague and loosely worded.27 The phrase 
"necessary or advisable" in the Pennsylvania statute above is an 
obvious example of loose terminology. Does this almost universal 
ambiguity of statutory language mean that we can't do any better? 
'. Does it cast doubt on our ability to deal with the problem by 
statute? It seems clear that the problem must be faced and that 
the courts and hospital administrators should be entitled to both 
expert opinion directed toward the individual case and to a stat-
utory policy statement of the prerequisites for hospitalization. In 
this connection it is worth noting that the Draft Act statement, 
which seems to be the most precise of any of the above statutes, 
has been criticized, but on policy grounds, rather than for am-
25S4A N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1951) §2. 
26 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 50, §1072. 
27 See the criticism of the New York and !Draft Act provisions in Whitmore, "Com-
ments on the Draft Act for the Hospitalization· of the Mentally Ill," 19 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 512 at 521 and notes 45-48 (1951). · , · 
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biguity or vagueness.28 However, for want of a better term, the 
phrase "mental illness" will be used herein essentially as it appears 
in the Draft Act, i.e., as indicating a general personality disorder 
(Draft Act, section la) coupled with either the situation where 
the patient is dangerous to himself or others, or with the situation 
where the patient needs hospitalization and lacks sufficient mental 
capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to hospitaliza-
tion (Draft Act, section 9g). This paper does not deal with the 
problems of commitment of mental defectives, formerly called 
feeble-minded, or of alcoholics, or drug addicts. These groups 
present separate although related policy issues.29 
(2) The term "mental hospital" is used herein, rather than 
"insane asylum." There are two kinds of mental hospitals. "Tem-
porary-care hospitals" specialize in short-term diagnostic screening 
and treatment and include general hospital mental facilities, psy-
chiatric out-patient clinics, receiving hospitals, and psychopathic 
hospitals. "Prolonged-care hospitals" include the "regular" state 
hospitals and most private hospitals. Although such a hospital may 
also handle diagnosis and short-term intensive treatment, a great 
majority of patients are those who receive long-term treatment 
and custodial care. 
(3) "Patient" is used here and in most statutes rather than 
the older term "inmate" which had undesirable criminal im-
plications. The term is also used here and in most of the recent 
statutes to describe a person against whom involuntary commit-
ment proceedings have been instituted. 
(4) "Conditional release" describes a situation where a patient 
is carried on the books of the hospital but is not a resident. The 
older statutes use the terms "parole" or "furlough" while more 
recent statutes use "home care," "trial visit," "convalescent 
leave," etc. 
28Ibid. 
29 The mental defective who needs institutional treatment is usually placed in a 
special institution, called a school, rather than in a mental hospital. The program of 
treatment is primarily custodial and educational, directed toward ·teaching the patient 
to live within his limitations. The narcotic addict is also treated as a special case, partly 
because of the close relation between addiction and the illegal drug traffic and partly 
because -treatment in the regular mental hospitals has not been very successful. Most of 
the severe cases are treated in the United States Public Health hospitals which specialize 
in treatment and research in the narcotic field. There is a distinct trend toward treatment 
of the alcoholic as a separate class. Hospital treatment is rarely effective, especially in 
crowded state hospitals where ·the alcoholics are frequently housed along with other 
patients. The answer seems to lie in the establishment of clinics at the local level which 
treat alcoholics primarily on an outpatient basis. 
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(5) "Commitment" refers to the procedures for compulsory 
hospitalization. A few states use "involuntary hospitalization" or 
"certification." The latter term is confusing, since in some states 
voluntary patients must also be "certified" as in need of treatment 
in order to allow public funds to be used for their care. 
C. Types of Hospitalization Procedures 
The problems involved in the admission of a patient to a 
mental hospital are usually thought of in terms of formal com-
mitment proceedings involving compulsory hospitalization for an 
indefinite period. There are at least six separate types of admission 
procedures. 
I. Voluntary Admission. This involves a written request for 
admission by a patient who is competent to make such a request. 
A number of states also authorize the parent or guardian of a 
minor to make the application. In most states, the patient may be 
detained, either for a fixed period after admission (typically 60 
days), or for a brief period after he requests release (typically 
IO days). 
2. Admission by Guardian. A number of states authorize the 
guardian of an adjudicated incompetent to commit the ward to 
a mental hospital, either with or without the consent of the court 
which supervises the guardian. Although some statutes refer to 
this as voluntary admission, it is compulsory as far as the patient 
is concerned and should be treated separately as a form of 
commitment. 
3. Non-protested Admission. This procedure is sometimes re-
ferred to as "involuntary admission." Non-protested admission is 
not the same as voluntary admission, since no affirmative action 
is required of the patient, nor is it compulsory since a protest by 
the patient is effective. A number of states authorize the hospital 
to receive a patient who is presented for admission by a friend, 
relative, or physician. If he protests at the time of admission, he 
may not be received, and if he protests after admission, he must 
be discharged within a short period, or compulsory proceedings 
must be instituted. 
4. Emergency Commitment. Almost every state has some au-
thorization for compulsory commitment to a mental hospital in 
emergency cases, where the patient may be dangerous to himself 
or others and needs immediate care. The procedure is summary 
and permits detention only for a short period. 
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5. Temporary Commitment. This is the newest of the com-
pulsory procedures and is primarily a device for diagnostic screen-
ing, although it is also used for short-term treatment. It developed 
from the older emergency procedures, but is not based on the 
existence of a clear emergency. The procedure is summary and 
authorizes detention for a limited period. 
6. Formal Commitment. This procedure is the one most com-
monly used and generally involves commitment for an inde-
terminate period after a full-dress judicial hearing in which the 
prospective patient is given a chance to contest the need for 
hospitalization. 
The purpose of this paper is to survey existing statutes and 
case law on formal, or indeterminate, commitment. In almost every 
state the other procedures exist side by side with the formal pro-
cedure, and. many patients who are ultimately committed for an 
indeterminate period are first admitted under one of the other 
provisions. The relationship between these procedures has been 
dealt with elsewhere. 30 
II. THE THEORY OF COMPULSORY COMMITMENT 
Mental illness, as such, like any other illness, is a medical 
problem and is primarily of concern to the medical profession, 
especially to the psychiatrist who specializes in the diagnosis and 
treatment of mental illness, and to the clinical psychologist (not 
an M.D.) who deals with diagnostic and testing procedures. One 
of the principal characteristics of mental illness, or possibly even 
a definition, is the failure of the individual to adapt to the society 
of which he is a part. Whether the illness results from organic 
causes, such as paresis, or is one of the diseases for which no 
organic cause can be found, the symptoms of serious mental ill-
ness are essentially those of release, or regression to an unin-
hibited state. The social controls, including the individual's 
ability to· work within a complex human relationship, are usually 
the first to suffer deterioration. This failure may result in the 
inability of the individual to care for himself, or it may be ex-
.•:. 
30 Legal aspects of voluntary admissions are discussed in detail in my article, "Hos-
pitalization of the Voluntary Mental Patient," 53 MICH. L. REv. 353 (1955). Procedures (2) 
~o)-lgh (5) and their relation to formal commitment are discussed in Ross, "Hospitalli:-
ing :the Mentally Ill-Emergency and Temporary Commitments," printed in CURRENT. 
TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 1955-56, p. 461 (1957). 
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pressed in antisocial conduct directed at others. In either case, 
the problems are no longer medical, but have social and legal 
consequences. Thus the law, which is the most specialized and 
coercive of social controls, is used to regulate and channel the 
by-products of mental illness. The principal policy questions in 
the area of compulsory hospitalization are: 
(1) What degree or type of social-adaptive failure should be 
required to justify hospitalization against the wishes of the 
individual? 
(2) How can this standard be incorporated in legal proce-
dures so that the policy reasons behind the standard will be 
effectuated, and, at the same time, the individual will be pro-
tected against unwarranted deprivation of his liberty? 
(3) What effect, if any, should compulsory hospitalization 
have on the legal rights of the individual, other than his loss of 
personal liberty? Should a committed person have the power to 
appoint an agent, get a divorce, make a will, etc., or should 
hospitalization automatically result in total loss of legal capacity? 
This last question is discussed in Part IV. 
A. The Legal Justification for Commitment 
A careful reading of the four statutory definitions of mental 
illness set forth in a preceding section31 indicates that whatever 
agreement exists as to the purpose of the commitment laws, a 
consensus can not be found in the statutes. Just when is a patient 
a "proper subject for care and treatment" under the Wisconsin 
statute? Under many of the statutes it is not clear whether the 
commitment process is primarily protective, custodial, or 
therapeutic. 
I. The Police Power. The clearest justification for compul-
sory commitment comes from the power of the state to protect 
itself against breaches of the peace. The police power is ". . . one 
of the most essential of powers, at times the most insistent, and al-
ways one of the least !imitable of the powers of government."32 A 
31Notes 21-26 supra. The statutory provisions of all of the states are listed in Tables 
1 and 3 of Appendix I infra. Of the 43 states which utilize judicial commitment proce-
dures, 4 predicate commitment on danger to society, 5 on the fact that the patient needs 
treatment and will ,benefit from it, 28 states and tlle Draft Act allow either criteria, and 
in 6 states the statutes are silent on the subject. Of the 14 states using ex parte commit-
ment, 3 and the Draft Act use danger, 1 need of treatment, 5 either ground, and not 
stated in 5. 
32District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 1!18 at 149 (1909). 
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person who is not mentally ill can be incarcerated for life if he 
is guilty of violence against persons or property, and the impri-
sonment is used both as retribution and to protect society from 
future violence. Can the same person be imprisoned indefinitely 
in order to protect society where he has not yet been guilty of a 
crime, but will probably commit a crime in the future? The 
decisions on the constitutionality of the "sexual psychopath" laws 
indicate an affirmative answer. While some of these statutes, such 
as that of Ohio, apply only to persons convicted of crime, some 
states do not require prior criminal conduct as a prerequisite to 
indeterminate imprisonment. Thus a Minnesota statute which 
allowed indefinite incarceration for a person adjudged a "psycho-
pathic personality" was upheld by the Supreme Court, where 
the statute defined a "psychopath" as a person "irresponsible for 
his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous 
to other persons."33 The court said that the element of danger 
is a fact which calls for proof of past (non-criminal) conduct 
pointing to probable future consequences, and is as susceptible of 
proof as many criteria constantly applied in criminal 
prosecutions. 34 
The Draft Act states that a person can be committed when 
he is mentally ill and because of his illness is "likely to injure ... 
others if allowed to remain at liberty."35 Many commitment 
statutes contain similar language. Since the purpose of such a 
statute is the protection of society rather than retribution, the 
constitutional protections afforded in criminal prosecutions are 
not required. There is one obvious constitutional limitation, the 
requirement of an indeterminate sentence. Since the only justi-
fication for depriving such a person of his liberty is that he is 
dangerous to society, the restraint can last only as long as the 
danger exists. Presumably, commitment for a fixed term would 
be unconstitutional. 
2. The State as Parens Patriae. The other major source of 
state authority over the mentally ill is the position of the state as 
parens patriae. Under this doctrine the sovereign has both the 
right and the duty to protect the persons and property of those 
who are unable to care themselves because of minority or mental 
33 Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 at 272 (1940). 
34 Id. at 274. 
35 Draft Act, §9(g). 
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illness. In England, the guardianship of those under legal dis-
ability was originally intrusted to the feudal lords, but was taken 
over by the Crown in the 13th century and delegated to the Lord 
Chancellor. In this country, the royal prerogative was inherited 
by the individual states and has been held to constitute part of 
the original inherent jurisdiction of the equity courts.86 The 
doctrine of parens patriae has been the primary source of the law 
of guardianship87 and the juvenile courts laws38 and is clearly 
reflected in many commitment statutes. Probably the clearest 
example of the parens patricte concept is the Draft Act section 
which provides as an alternative ground for compulsory com-
mitment that the patient "is in need of custody, care or treatment 
in a· mental hospital and, because of his illness, lacks sufficient in-
sight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to 
hospitalization."39 Another part of the same section authorizes 
commitment where the patient is likely to injure himself if allowed 
to remain at large. 
The gradual extension of the parens patriae concept to com-
pulsory commitment raises a number of difficult policy questions 
which can be illustrated by the case of John S: 
John S. is an elderly man, living alone on a small farm. His 
intellectual capacities are adequate to make a marginal living, 
care for his farm and get along with his neighbors. The only 
difficulty is that he is subject to fits of severe depression, lasting 
for several months. A competent psychiatrist estimates that there 
is a two-to-one chance that if left unrestrained he will commit 
suicide within the next year or two during a depressed state. John 
recognizes his illness as an intermittent manic-depressive psy-
chosis, but prefers to remain on his farm and run the risk of self-
destruction. Should this man, who is clearly not a danger to any-
one except himself, be hospitalized against his wishes? Is this 
the kind of choice that should be made by the state, or should it 
be left to the individual? 
I suspect that if this case were put to a representative group of 
lawyers, there would be considerable disagreement, both as to 
the "correct" answer and as to the additional factors to be con-
864 POMEROY, EQ. JUR., 5th ed., §§1303-1314 (1941). 
87 MADDEN, DOMES'rIC RELATIONS §151 (1931). 
881n re T-urner, 94 Kan. ll5, 145 P. 871 (1915). 
89 Draft Act, §9(g). 
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sidered. The language of most commitment statutes is broad 
enough to allow a decision either way. Some would argue that 
the sanctity of human life is an absolute (except in wartime) and 
the state has a duty to preserve the life of its subjects. Analogous 
principles could be used from the law of guardianship and from 
the statutes which make attempted suicide a crime. Others would 
argue that the law should not be concerned with social non-con-
formity, and that everyone has a right "to go to Hell in his own 
way." There are other factors which may or may not be important. 
Should the commitment court consider the estimated cost of 
psychiatric care, both to the patient and to the taxpayers? Should 
the probability and duration of successful treatment affect the 
decision? Should a guardian of the property be appointed, and, 
if so, how can the decisions of the court which appoints the 
guardian be correlated with the court which is responsible for 
the commitment decision? In many states these are two different 
courts. 
The justification which has been advanced for commitment 
of the "harmless" patient (in the sense of harmless to others) is 
essentially the same as the justification for guardianship. Where 
a patient does not have the mental capacity to make a sound 
decision relative to his own hospitalization, the state will step in 
and make it for him, even though the same individual does have 
capacity to make a will or a contract. This is an example of 
"partial incompetency." 
The authors of the Draft Act have stated: 
"Within the wide range of mental illnesses there are cases 
in which the sick individual, like the individual who is phys-
ically sick, retains sufficient capacity to make a responsible 
decision on the question of his hospitalization, weighing it 
against other factors in his life and affairs. On the other 
hand, without being 'dangerous,' a mentally ill individual 
may, because of the nature or stage of his illness, lose his 
power to make choices or become so confused as no longer 
to have the capacity to make a decision having any relation to 
the factors bearing on his hospitalization. It is in the latter 
situation that the Act permits compulsory hospitalization. 
"The mentally ill individual who is found to have retained 
this capacity cannot be compelled to enter a hospital unless 
he is 'dangerous.' 
"It should be emphasized that it is not a question of the indi-
vidual agreeing or disagreeing with medical judgment as to 
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the nature of his illness or the need for hospital care, but 
rather of whether he is capable of making a responsible, not 
necessarily a wise, decision in the premises. 
"In short, the State through its courts is here authorized to 
make for the individual a decision, which, by reason of his 
illn•ess, he is incapable of making for himself."40 
Guttmacher and Weihofen have endorsed the Draft Act pro-
vision, 41 but several writers from both the legal and medical pro-
fessions have expressed dissent.42 Probably the strongest criticism 
that has been expressed is found in an article by Dr. Charles 
Whitmore.43 Dr. Whitmore states that the second ground for 
compulsory hospitalization (that the patient needs care and because 
of his illness is unable to make a responsible decision with respect 
to hospitalization) is a radical departure from existing law and 
is an unsound policy decision. He argues that this provision would 
allow the compulsory detention of groups which have not been 
hospitalized in the past, such as the severe psychoneurotic. Dr. 
Whitmore's position seems to be overstated. The psychoneurotic 
is rarely benefited by hospital treatment. The few extremely 
severe cases would be hospitalized under the first ground stated 
in the Draft Act, i.e., that they are dangerous to others. Very 
rarely could a psychoneurotic be hospitalized under the second 
ground. In almost all cases the psychoneurotic recognizes his 
condition and is able to make a responsible decision relative to 
hospitalization. However, there is a large group of prospective 
patients who are not yet dangerous to themselves or others, who 
are not mentally able to realize their condition or make respon-
sible decisions, but who need hospitalization before their condition 
deteriorates, as it may without treatment. This group consists 
of the early stage manic-depressives and schizophrenics. It is for 
this group of psychotic patients that the second ground for hos-
pitalization in the Draft Act has been designed. 
While the weight of both expert and legislative authority 
favors retention of the second ground for hospitalization, it should 
be understood that it is not an easy test to administer. The Draft 
40 Draft Act, , Commentary, p. 28. 
41 PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 311-312 (1952). 
42 Curran, "Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill," 31 N.C. L. REv. 274 at 291 (1953). 
Cf. Szasz, "Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law," 58 CoL. L. REv. 183 at 197 (1958). 
43 "Comments on a Draft Act for the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill," 19 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 512 at 522 (1951). 
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Act test refers to the capacity of the individual to make a rational 
choice, not the wisdom of the choice. But isn't an unwise choice 
evidence of incapacity? Specifically, if all the experts agree that 
the benefits of hospitalization for a particular individual outweigh 
the disadvantages (loss of personal liberty), does not the patient's 
failure to heed the voice of authority give rise to a strong presump-
tion that he is incapable of making a rational choice, or is it 
merely evidence of non-conformity? Unfortunately, no statute can 
by its terms indicate just where non-conformity ends and in-
capacity begins. 
B. Commitment and the Decision Making Process 
One of the most fruitful ways to consider mixed issues of 
law and fact, such as commitment, is to consider the problem as 
essentially one of judicial administration, i.e., who decides the 
question and what kind of guides is the decision maker given.44 
The illustration given in the preceding section Qohn S.) illus-
trates some important points which go to the heart of the com-
mitment process. 
1. The decision on commitment may have to be correlated 
with the decision on guardianship. Should both of these functions 
be lodged in the same court? Clearly the trend in judicial admin-
istration furnishes an affirmative answer. The end result of this 
trend would be to set up a separate court to handle all matters of 
personal status, or to bring under one court all areas which re-
quire specialized social service assistance furnished within the 
court structure.45 Thus, in some jurisdictions, guardianship, 
adoption, domestic relations, and juvenile problems are handled 
by a single court, and in a very few jurisdictions, commitment 
cases are handled by the same court.46 
2. The generally accepted modern view of commitment is 
that it is essentially a medical problem. Under the influence of 
this concept, most commitment statutes provide for examination 
44A recent example of this type of thinking can be found in Pfeifer v. Standard 
Gateway Theater, 262 Wis. 229, 55 iN.W. (2d) 29 (1952). The court held that in a negli-
gence case, the issue of factual cause should be put to the jury, unincumbered by concepts 
of foreseeability, and in those few cases where liability ought to be limited to foreseeable 
(or proximate) consequences, this is a decision for the court after verdict. 
45 VmTUE, FAMILY CAsEs IN COURT, chapters 1, 10 and 11 (1956). 
46 °TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT OF THE CITY 
OF NEW YORK 13 (1956). 
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and report by a panel of two physicians appointed by the court. 
There has been a strong trend toward reliance on court-appointed 
experts who make the decision with very little control by the 
court. The same trend is observable in the criminal law where 
insanity is used as a defense. 
There are two defects in the concept that commitment is an 
essentially medical judgment. In the first place, exclusive reliance 
upon the psychiatrist or physician arises in part from _!:he assump-
tion that the diagnostic aspect of psychiatry is a branch of medi-
cine. Psychiatry is primarily an art rather than a science. When an 
individual is unable to adjust to society, the psychiatrist is able 
to formulate a theory of causation which, because of his ex-
perience and training, is more sophisticated than that of a lay-
man. In the same sense, the sociologist can usually work out a more 
reliable theory on the causes of aberrant group behavior than can 
a banker, although possibly the sociologist will run second to the 
politician. The point is that mental illness is not a fact in the 
same sense that a broken leg is; it is a theory used to explain 
deviant behavior.47 
Secondly, the psychiatrist, who is trained both in medicine 
and in mental illness, is not necessarily the person most qualified 
to decide on commitments. Recall the case of John S. The "facts," 
meaning expert theories, guesses, and estimates of future conduct, 
were given as part of the problem, and are not controverted. But 
agreement on facts does not dispose of the issue of compulsory 
commitment. Commitment depends on social value judgments. 
In the John S. case, any decision will draw a line between the 
conflicting policies of individual liberty and state sanctions against 
self-destruction. Clearly this is not a medical or even a psychiatric 
judgment.48 
A recent article by a psychiatrist points out: 
"The fact that court approval is usually granted routinely 
on the basis of medical testimony regarding the alleged need 
for commitment signifies that by so acting physicians fulfill a 
47 A recent article by a psychiatrist •points out that the analogy between medicine 
and psychiatry is dangerously misleading (dangerous to both the law and to psychiatry). 
See Szasz, "Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law," 58 CoL. L. REv. 183 at 187-192 
(1958). 
48 One of the few articles by a member of the legal profession which recognizes this 
problem is Dession, "Deviation and Community Sanctions," published in PSYCHIATRY 
AND THE LAW, edited by HOCH and ZUBIN (1955). 
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special social role, unrelated to their technical knowledge. 
Accordingly, by entering into this legal situation, the physi-
cian (psychiatrist) acts in the role of one of s0ciety's agents 
whose duty it is to enforce compliance with certain social 
rules .... [T]his may be an entirely 'legitimate' and morally 
defensible role, similar to the roles, for example, of policeman 
and judge. It is, however, scientifically misleading to equate 
this role with that of an 'individual therapist' vis-a-vis the 
patient .... If court action is to be determined this way, then 
why not conclude that the psychiatrist has nothing to con-
tribute to the proceedings? Judge and jury are by the very 
definition of our democratic society the official experts in de-
ciding which modes of behavior are socially unacceptable."49 
It might be argued that the above contention is valid only 
where the ground for commitment is based on parens patriae, but 
not where it is based on the police power, since danger to society 
is both a concept which finds greater agreement as a ground, and 
is also more closely related to a psychiatric prediction of the 
future course of the illness. This distinction is unsound. The 
real question is not whether the individual is dangerous to society, 
but how dangerous to whom, and what degree of danger can 
society tolerate. Certainly the latter question is essentially a policy 
issue. A truck driver with a mild neurosis who is "accident 
prone" is probably a greater danger to society than most psy-
chotics; yet he will not be committed for treatment, even if he 
would be benefited. The answer lies in shifting him to a non-
driving job, and the decision will probably be made by the em-
ployer rather than the psychiatrist. Even if the danger can not 
be alleviated, the community expects a certain amount of dan-
gerous activity. I suspect that as a class drinking drivers are a 
greater danger than the mentally ill, and yet the drivers are 
tolerated, or punished with small fines rather than indeterminate 
imprisonment. Maybe our treatment of the drunken driver is not 
the best choice, but the point is that it is a social choice rather 
than a medical issue. 
Once it is recognized that the medical witness, in a commit-
ment proceeding, is acting as one of "society's agents" in determin-
49 Szasz, HCommitment of the Mentally ru: 'Treatment' or Social Restraint?" 125 J. 
NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 293 (1957). 'I1his article contains ·the most complete sum-
mary of psychiatric literature on the role of the psychiatrist in legal proceedings. 
1959] COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY !LL 963 
ing an essentially sociological question, several conclusions im-
portant to judicial administration can be drawn. 
a. If impartial experts are to be used, there seems to be no 
reason why the panel should be limited to physicians, or even 
to psychiatrists. The social case worker, sociologist, or clinical 
psychologist knows as much about social values as the doctor of 
medicine, if not more. 
b. In order to emphasize to the participants in the decision 
making process that the questions are essentially social, the 
statutes defining mental illness should be phrased in non-psychiat-
ric terms50 and the expert witnesses should be required to testify 
in terms of social facts and predictions rather than in psychiatric 
terms. Specifically, the expert should not be asked "Is this man 
psychotic" or "Is he a proper subject for commitment." The 
questions should be phrased as follows: What is the probability 
that this man will behave in such and such a manner in the 
future, specifying the sorts of situations which involve danger to 
himself or others? What is the possibility that such situations will 
occur? What is the probability of a successful cure? How long 
will it take? 
c. While only one state still requires a mandatory jury trial, 
about half the states allow a jury trial on request of the patient. 
As a policy matter, most authorities are opposed to the use of 
the optional jury on the ground that the jury is not competent 
to determine the medical issues involved. Thus one author has 
stated that the use of a jury "is about as sensible as calling in the 
neighbors to diagnose meningitis or scarlet fever."151 If the decision 
is based on sociological values, the cross-section of the community 
may be the best agent, not to diagnose mental illness, but to apply 
the diagnosis of the experts to the social context in which the 
patient exists. A recent Wisconsin statute explicitly recognizes 
the policy-making function of the optional jury by requiring a 
special verdict. The jury is asked two questions: Is the patient 
mentally ill? If so, should he be committed?52 
150 Psychiatrists discourage the use of teohnical terms in ,the statutes, as the classifica-
tion of mental illness is still in a state of flux. Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry 
(Report No. 9, Committee on Forensic Psychiatry) p. I (1949). 
51 STERN, MENTAL ILLNESS: A GUIDE FOR THE FAMILY 37 (1942). For other criticisms 
of the optional jury, see Draft Act, Commentary, p. 26; GUITMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 299 (1952); comment, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 at 1192 (1947). 
52Wis. Stat. (1957) §51.03. 
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d. The points listed above are arguments in favor of limiting 
the role of the medical witness to the presentation of expert opin-
ion, with decision on the policy issues being left to a judge or 
jury, and the purpose of this limitation is to further the decision 
process. There is an additional purpose to be served by such a 
limitation-the encouragement of effective psychotherapy. Reli-
ance on the psychiatrist to make the commitment decision has two 
adverse effects on the psychiatrist-it damages him psychologically, 
and damages his future effectiveness as a healer. As to the first 
point, the psychiatrist is trained to identify with his patient. He 
is therapy-oriented and trained to think of his prime obligation 
as that to his patient. When he is making a commitment decision, 
he is forced to identify with the community, a conflicting role 
which may cause trouble. One psychiatrist has indicated that there 
is a widespread reluctance in the psychiatric profession to enter 
into the commitment process, and suggests that this role-conflict 
may be part of the cause.53 Secondly, the practice in a few states is 
to allow commitment by the superintendent or staff physician of 
the same state hospital to which the patient will be committed. In 
other states, the patient whose indefinite commitment is being 
sought may already be in the hospital as a voluntary patient or 
under an emergency order, and the doctor who has been treating 
him is called on to participate in the commitment process. This 
practice should be avoided. Not only does placing the duties of 
"prosecutor and judge" on the hospital staff lead to public criti-
cism, but more important, it breaks down the vital relation of trust 
and confidence between the patient and his therapist. One of the 
most difficult problems faced by the psychiatrist in treatment is 
persuading the patient to think for himself, a problem which is 
rendered more difficult if the same therapist is "the law" to the 
patient, with final authority to commit and discharge.54 
III. COMMITMENT PROCEDURES 
Proceedings for the compulsory commitment of a patient to 
a mental hospital must not violate the constitutional provisions 
that no person may be deprived of his liberty without due process 
53 Szasz, "Commitment of the Mentally Ill: 'Treatment' or Social Restraint?" 125 J. 
Nmvous AND MENTAL DISEASE 293 at 305 (1957). See also Dession, "Deviation and Com-
munity Sanctions," in HoCH AND ZUBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 10 (1955). 
54Szasz, "Psychiatry, Ethics, and ,the Criminal Law,'' 58 CoL. L. REv. 183 at 198 (1958); 
comment, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 at 1200, n. 106 (1947). 
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of law. However, what may be needed to satisfy the constitutional 
requirements may vary with the circumstances, and nowhere is 
this principle more aptly illustrated than in the conflicting de-
cisions on due process in commitment cases. 
The precise requirements of due process are hard to state in 
any area of the law, and especially so in the field of commitments 
for the following reasons: 
(I) A glance at the statutes discussed in this article reveals a 
wide variety of enactments, many of them loosely worded. The 
procedural aspects of commitment are the subject of continuous 
legislative experimentation and there is a bewildering array of 
commitment methods. As a result many judicial decisions have 
turned on narrow questions of statutory interpretation and there 
are few reported judicial decisions in which the result rested on 
constitutional issues. Many of these procedures have remained 
on the statute books for years with little or no constitutional 
litigation. 
(2) An additional factor which creates uncertainty in the con-
stitutional area is the fact that many of the decisions which are 
reported are relatively old. Since they were rendered, there have 
been substantial changes in both psychiatric and legal understand-
ing of the problems of mental illness. It is by no means certain 
that a modern court would adhere without qualification to the 
views expressed during the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
This basic disagreement as to the minimum constitutional re-
quirements has led to a bewildering variety of procedures. An 
additional factor which has produced the same result is disagree-
ment as to the feasibility of procedural safeguards over and above 
those imposed by the constitution. The legal profession has em-
phasized the need to guard against "railroading" by the use of 
procedures adopted from criminal or civil trials. A fair hearing 
on notice, the right to counsel, and the right to a jury trial are not 
mere "technicalities," but represent principles of justice in dealing 
with human rights which have evolved over the centuries. 
"The terms 'star chamber' and lettre de cachet describe no 
imaginary evils dreamed up by cautious lawyers, but very 
real practices current not so many hundreds of years ago, and 
hardly exceeded in arbitrariness, tyranny and injustice by 
practices rampant in Germany and elsewhere in our own 
times. 
"Safeguards designed to guarantee fair procedure and 
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to prevent the abuse of commitment laws ... are therefore not 
mere technicalities and formalities to be lightly brushed aside 
in favor of some summary commitment procedure."55 
The reported cases indicate that occasional abuses do crop up, 
and they are abuses which could be prevented by a rigid adherence 
to traditional legal procedures.56 
On the other hand, it is clear that legal formalities may do 
positive harm to the mental patient. A person who is already 
mentally disturbed should not be forced to sit through a public 
hearing and listen to his family and physician testify to his infirmi-
ties. The president of the American Psychiatric Association had 
this to say on commitment procedures: 
"Not long ago in California a wife decided that her husband 
was mentally sick. He was depressed and had delusions that 
persons were trying to kill him. Following the regular legal 
procedure she swore out a warrant, the sheriff arrested the 
patient, and he was taken to the county jail, there to await a 
hearing before the judge. That night he hanged himself in 
the jail. To those sticklers for legal procedure and defense 
qf the legal rights of the patient, I would point out that his 
legal rights were well preserved. He was arrested on a warrant 
by a sheriff; he was not sent to a hospital without due process 
of law and a chance to appear before the judge. Perhaps if 
he had, he might be alive today. The point I wish to make 
is that the public is so obsessed with the legal point of view 
and the alleged infallibility of legal procedure that they in-
sist on protecting the so-called legal rights of the patient with-
out th~nking of what his medical rights are."57 
The defects in the ordinary forms of judicial procedure when 
applied to the determination of mental illness are now widely 
recognized. Fortunately, many states have attempted to devise 
procedures which would protect the sane and provide minimum 
interference with the treatment process. 
Although procedures vary widely, two basic methods pre-
dominate. The most common, referred to as "judicial commit-
ment," involves a hearing before a court or a quasi-judicial ad-
55 Weihofen and Overholser, "Commit!!Ilent of the Mentally Ill," 24 TEX. L. R.Ev. 
307 at 337 (1946). 
56For a good example of a "railroading'' case, see Shields v. Shields, (W.D. Mo. 
1939) 26 F. Supp. 211. 
57Bowman, Presidential Address, 103 .AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1 at 12 (1946). 
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ministrative body. Ex parte commitment, used in fourteen states, 
permits indeterminate commitment without a hearing. The com-
mitment order is issued by a physician, public health officer or 
judge, and a hearing is held only if the patient appeals the order. 
The specific procedures for both methods and the statutory 
references for the 49 states are set forth in Tables I to 4 of Appen-
dix I infra, and the text of the judicial commitment section of the 
Draft Act is reprinted in Appendix II. Particular aspects of com-
mitment procedure have been discussed in detail elsewhere.58 The 
purpose of this section is to summarize the existing statutes and 
to identify the major problems and the recent trends in commit-
ment procedure. 
A. Judicial Commitment 
I. Pre-hearing Procedures. In all of the 43 states which utilize 
judicial commitment the action is initiated by a pleading, often 
called an application, petition or complaint, which usually must 
be verified. In most states any person can make such an applica-
tion. In a few states the right to initiate proceedings is limited to 
certain select groups, such as the guardian of the patient, a 
physician or public official. Presumably, the reason for limiting 
the applicant to members of a specified class is the same reason 
for the requirement of verification: to discourage the ground-
less application. 
A more effective method of preventing unnecessary proceed-
ings is the requirement that a physician's report accompany the 
application. The report, made after a personal examination, serves 
another purpose: the provision for medical evidence at the hear-
ing. In 34 states the statute requires that the court order a medical 
examination by one or more doctors appointed by the court. With 
the exceptions of Alaska, Kansas, and Rhode Island, all states re-
quire either one of these procedure,s, thus insuring that some medi-
cal evidence is available for the court. It is surprising that even 
three states would permit commitment without any medical 
examination. 
58 On procedural due process generally, see the sections on the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments in CORWIN, CONsrrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES .ANNOTATED (1953). On jury 
trials in commitment proceedings, see Williams, "Public-Law Adjudications of Mental 
Unsoundness and Commitability in Texas: Jury Trial Policy," 1 BAYLOR L. R.Ev. 248 
(1949). On notice, hearings and evidence, see the references cited in note 19 supra; and 
articles in 24 TEX. L. REv. 307 (1946); 13 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 99 (1941); 3 STAN. L. REv. 
109 (1950). 
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Some states, and the Draft Act, require both medical examina-
tions. This duplication seems to be unnecessary in light of the fact 
that approximately 90 percent of commitments are uncontested. 
Probably the best procedure would be to require a medical certif-
icate with the application in all cases and require a separate ex-
amination only in those cases which are contested by the patient. 
Generally, the pre-hearing examination is conducted by physi-
cians, or, if they are available, psychiatrists. Minnesota has an in-
teresting and worthwhile provision, which is one of the few statu-
tory recognitions that the need for commitment is both a medical 
and a social issue. The Minnesota court may appoint a social 
worker or welfare agency to conduct a social case work investiga-
tion. Oklahoma also has an interesting innovation and one which 
appears desirable. A pre-hearing examination is held by two 
doctors and one attorney. The physicians advise the court on the 
extent of mental illness and the attorney advises the court on the 
need for concurrent guardianship proceedings.59 
2. Notice of the· Hearing. Most statutes are deficient with re-
spect to a major part of the hearing process-the provision for ade-
quate and timely notice. Tp.e function of the notice is to provide 
an opportunity for the patient who wishes to contest the commit-
ment at th~ hearing the chance to prepare for the hearing. Mea-
sured by this standard, most of the statutes are defective in one or 
more of the following respects: 
(a) In many states the notice is served only two or three days 
prior to the hearing. This short period is not adequate for a con-
tested hearing and is probably utilized because the statutes were 
drawn up when commitment was used mainly for dangerous pa-
tients who were held in jail pending a hearing. Today there is no 
necessity for a quick hearing, since many patients can be treated 
on an out-patient basis while waiting for a hearing, and the dan-
gerous patient can be hospitalized pending the hearing under one 
of the emergency admission procedures. 
(b) Ideally, the notice should do more than inform the patient 
of the time and place of the hearing. Too many statutes set forth a 
notice form phrased in complex legal terms. The notice specified 
by the recent Texas Mental Health Act is a model of simplicity 
and completeness. In laymen's language it tells the patient what 
59 Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §54. 
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the hearing issues will be and advises him of his right to a jury 
trial, his right to counsel, and how these rights can be exercised.60 
(c) Many of these statutes require notice to the patient, but do 
not provide for any notice to others who may be interested in his 
commitment. A carefully drawn statute, such as the Draft Act, 
would also require notice to a guardian, if any has previously 
been appointed, to the spouse, and to close relatives. These persons 
should be notified, if their location is known, even though they 
are outside of the state. 
( d) Most states wisely provide that if the medical examiners 
certify that notice to the patient would be harmful, the court can 
omit personal notice. However, few states provide an adequate 
substitute for personal notice when it has been omitted. The 
Washington statute is the only one which is really adequate in this 
respect. Notice to the patient can be dispensed with for medical 
reasons only when the notice is served on a court-appointed guar-
dian ad litem who must be an attorney. 
3. The Hearing. The hearing is customarily held in either the 
probate court or in the general trial court, although in seven states 
the hearing is held by a specialized quasi-judicial agency with judi-
cial powers. The hearing is mandatory, except that four states pro-
vide that the hearing will be held only if the patient requests it. 
In the uncontested case, the commitment decision is made on the 
written record which consists of the petition and the medical 
report. At first glance the optional hearing procedure seems de-
sirable, since most commitments are uncontested and the provision 
for a hearing only when requested does result in a substantial 
saving of time and effort. However, there are too many important 
auxiliary decisions for the hearing to be dispensed with. Specifi-
cally, the hearing ought to reveal the need for a legal guardianship, 
which is a decision which can not be made on the record alone. In 
three of the four states which do not hold hearings in all cases, the 
commitment order does not result in automatic incompetency. In 
the uncontested case the patient is hospitalized, legally capable of 
executing deeds and contracts, and no consideration is given to the 
need for protection of his estate from his own improvident acts. 
In a state such as New York where commitment does result in 
incompetency, the patient may be placed in the anomalous posi-
60Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1958) art. 5547-44. 
970 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [Vol. 57 
tion of being denied legal capacity, and yet having no substitute 
appointed to protect his estate from dissipation. Also, in many 
states, the question of the liability of the patient's estate and his 
relatives for the expenses of hospital care is made at the time of 
commitment, which, of course, requires a hearing in almost every 
case. 
4. Jury Trial. The obvious disadvantages of the mandatory 
jury trial have been recognized by all of the authorities, and today 
only Kentucky and Alaska require a jury in every case.61 The ma-
jority of states have completely dispensed with the jury system, 
although in 13 states it is available in contested cases where re-
quested by the patient. Personal observation indicates that the 
jury trial is rarely used where it is available, mainly because the 
patient is rarely informed of its availability. Most medical author-
ities state that the optional jury trial is unnecessary to protect the 
sane and is undesirable because a jury can be fooled by a paranoiac 
who can be lucid and convincing during the trial. The answer to 
both of these points lies in better presentation of the medical 
evidence, and neither objection seems a valid indictment of the 
jury system per se. As previously indicated in Part II (B), the ques-
tion of commitment is often more of a social problem than strictly 
medical, indicating that the jury trial may be worthwhile. Probably 
the best system would be to permit a jury trial where the patient or 
his guardian ad litem specifically request it but to require that a 
special verdict be used, as is done in Texas and Wisconsin.62 
5. Th'e Informal Nature of the Hearing. It is widely recognized 
that when the formal hearing is conducted in public with the 
patient compelled to be present the cumulative effect of the whole 
procedure is often medically harmful. The paranoiac is already 
suffering from the feeling that society is conspiring to punish him. 
If he is required to sit in a courtroom and listen to his physician 
and family testify against him, the experience will confirm his 
suspicions and make psychiatric treatment much more difficult. 
61 Several authors have recently stated that no state today requires a jury. See 
GUITMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952) at 300. The only exception 
listed is Texas, which amended its Constitution in 1953 to permit waiver of a jury. 
Apparently, in reading the Kentucky statute, ithe authors have been misled by the section 
title "Jury Trial may be had unless waived.'' The body of the statute requires a jury in 
every case. Ky. Rev. Stat. §202.080. Section titles are not part of the law in Kentucky 
(§446.140) and ,the attorney general ·has ruled that ·the jury is mandatory. Ky. Op. Atty. 
Gen. 39, 583 (1957). 
62 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1958) art. 5547-51; Wis Stat. (1957) §51.03. 
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Most commitment statutes, either expressly or by implication, no 
longer require the physical presence of the patient. A number of 
states also provide that the court may exclude all persons who do 
not have a legitimate interest in the hearing, and permit the court 
to hold the hearing at any place, including the home of the patient 
or a medical facility. The Draft Act expressly provides for all of 
the above, and, in addition, provides that the court is not bound by 
the technical rules of evidence, but can admit any relevant evidence 
for whatever weight it has. This last provision is very common in 
juvenile court and workmen's compensation acts, but as yet is not 
common in commitment statutes. 
All of these provisions a,re desirable and permit considerable 
variation between the degrees of formality required for contested 
and uncontested hearings. The major defect is that in most states 
there is no requirement that the patient be informed of his rights 
to be present or to require a formal hearing in open court. The 
recent Texas Act is a major improvement over many statutes in 
this respect. The statutory notice spells out in simple language the 
right to have a jury, an attorney, and the right to be present.63 
6. Representation by Counsel. As indicated in Appendix I, 
twenty-five states now expressly provide that the patient can be 
represented by counsel and nineteen require that the court must 
appoint counsel if the patient requests it. The primary purpose of 
allowing counsel to a patient is, of course, to insure that the patient 
has a real chance to contest the case. Many of the statutes on court-
appointed counsel are defective in one or more of the following 
aspects: (1) In most states, appointed counsel is either not com-
pensated at all, or a low fee is set by the statute. The result is that 
counsel is not encouraged to prepare adequately for the hearing. 
(2) In some states counsel is appointed on the day of the hearing. 
The aid of counsel tends to become a mere formality unless the 
attorney is appointed early enough so that he can consult with his 
client and gather the evidence. (3) Most of the states which do 
provide for appointed counsel do so only on request of the patient, 
and yet there is no provision requiring that the patient be in-
formed of his right to counsel. 
Since the traditional role of counsel has been thought of in 
terms of the prevention of "railroading" by designing relatives, 
the statutes of most of the states contemplate participation by 
63 Note 60 supra. 
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counsel only in the contested cases. There are other functions 
which can and should be served by counsel in all cases of long term 
hospitalization, whether the case is contested or not. In some juris-
dictions the court can commit the patient without loss of legal 
capacity, or can commit as incompetent. Where this choice is pos-
sible, counsel should assist the court in reaching a desirable deci-
sion. Furthermore, in many states there is no choice and every 
long term commitment order automatically results in legal incom-
petency, but no provision is made for the automatic appointment 
of a guardian. The patient is thus left in the peculiar position of 
being deprived of the right to deal with his property and having 
no responsible person appointed to substitute for him. In such a 
case the appointed counsel can be of great help by investigating 
the need for a separate guardianship action. 
B. Ex Parte Commitment 
Short-term commitment, without any hearing, is available in 
almost all of the states, either where the patient is dangerous and 
must be restrained until the formal proceedings can take place, or 
where the patient is committed for observation and diagnosis 
pending a formal hearing. 64 In fourteen states, the procedure .is 
available for indeterminate commitment, and in six states it is the 
only available procedure. The typical statute permits compulsory 
hospitalization on the certificate of two physicians who must make 
a personal examination. In several of the states the commitment 
order is approved by a judge, but the function of the judge is 
limited to determining whether the papers are in order. In a few 
states the committing doctors must report the fact of commitment 
to the relatives of the patient and to the state mental health agency. 
I. The Policy Basis of Ex Parte Commitment. The justifica-
tion for ex parte commitment is that most cases are uncontested, 
and it is inconvenient and costly to require a hearing in every 
case. In the few cases where the patient wishes to contest the 
commitment order, an appeal is available, either by a statutory 
appeal from the commitment order with a trial de novo, or by 
means of an independent habeas corpus action. Since the pro-
cedure is not based on the existence of an emergency or dangerous 
64 Emergency and ,temporary observation commitment on an ex parte •basis is dis-
cussed in Ross, "Hospitalizing tbe Mentally Ill-Emergency and Temporary Commit-
ments," in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 1955-56, P· 401 (1957). 
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situation and is not subject to any initial public control, substan-
tial constitutional issues are raised. These will be discussed in 
the next section. For the same reasons, there is a greater possi-
bility of abuse of the procedure. In order to prevent possible 
misuse of the process, most of the statutes include one or more 
of the following safeguards: 
(I) The admission formalities are greater than in the case 
of emergency or short term observation commitment. Instead of 
allowing commitment on the certificate of one physician, as is 
common in the emergency case, the approval of two or more 
physicians, or of a designated public official, such as a health 
officer or coroner, is required. 
(2) In several states, the ex parte procedure is available only 
for use by the state hospital system. The state hospitals, usually 
overcrowded and understaffed, retain a veto power over the 
commitment decision and are not likely to accept a borderline 
case. 
The decision on whether or not ex parte commitment is 
wise is not easy to make. There are arguments in favor of the 
procedure: 
(I) The average layman thinks of a criminal trial when he 
thinks about law. A hearing before a black-robed judge, with 
lawyers, witnesses, bailiffs, and all the other trappings of a formal 
trial, is very apt to be confused with a criminal prosecution, 
especially by the disturbed patient who already feels that society 
is conspiring against him. The psychiatrists are almost unanimous 
in decrying the traumatic effects of a judicial hearing. 
(2) The provision for a trial de novo or an appeal from the 
commitment order is an adequate safeguard for the few contested 
cases. To provide an initial hearing in all cases, contested and 
uncontested, is a waste of time and effort, both for the court and 
for the medical witness. 
Most of the arguments against the ex parte procedure have 
already been mentioned elsewhere in this paper, and can be 
summarized as follows: 
(I) There are serious doubts as to the constitutionality of 
ex parte commitment. 
(2) The traumatic effects of a judicial hearing can be lessened 
or completely dissipated by the use of the flexible hearing pro-
cedures discussed in the previous section of this article, such as 
the abolition of the mandatory presence of the patient, the release 
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of the harmless patient to his family pending the hearing, and 
others. 
(3) When a patient is hospitalized without any judicial inter-
vention, there is apt to be no consideration given to the need 
for legal guardianship . 
. (4) No matter how well drafted, the statutory release proce-
dures are seldom adequate in fact. The patient who is already 
in a hospital and wishes to contest the decision of the committing 
doctor is often unable to find an attorney who can handle his 
petition for release. It is generally agreed that the state hospital 
systems of New York and California are among the best in the 
country, yet there are three cases from these states in which a 
patient's request to communicate with his attorney in order 
to file a habeas corpus petition was refused by the hospital 
authorities. 65 
(5) Placing the primary responsibility for commitment on 
the medical profession can injure the relation of trust between 
the patient and the psychiatrist who will be treating him. Where 
the patient suspects that all society is against him, the role of 
the law as a scapegoat may help the doctor, who does bear ultimate 
responsibility for the patient, to suggest that 'Tm on your side." 
My own conclusion is that the best results can be achieved 
by improving the judicial hearing rather than discarding it. 
While the ex parte hearing seems to work in the states that have 
adopted it, there is no strong trend in this country to dispense 
with the judicial hearing. The Draft Act did not incorporate 
the procedure, but concentrated on other areas. 
If a particular state does decide to adopt the ex parte process, 
the draftsmen should avoid simply copying the existing statutes 
from states which already use ex parte procedures. Examination 
of the statutes reveals two common defects: 
(1) Of the fourteen states listed in Tables 3 and 4 of the 
Appendix, in one state commitment results in automatic legal 
incompetency and in four states the law is not clear on this point. 
The lack of automatic consideration of the need for guardianship 
is especially important in these five states and could cause con-
siderable hardship where the patient is legally unable to deal 
with his property and no substitute is appointed. 
65 In re Hofmann, 131 Cal. App. (2d) 758, 281 P. (2d) 96 (1955); People ex rel. Jacobs 
v. Worthing, 167 Misc. 702, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 630 (1938); Hoff v. State, 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E. 
(2d) 671 (1939). 
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(2) In several of the states there is no specific release provision. 
In such a state, the only method of gaining release is the writ 
of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus procedure does not contain 
many of the built-in safeguards, such as the right to appointed 
counsel, that are contained in the more recent statutes which 
establish a specific hearing procedure for commitment. The 
commitment hearing statute is tailor-made to fit the needs of 
the mental patient. 
To meet the objections listed above, it is suggested that if 
ex parte commitment is used: 
(1) The procedure should be used only for the state 
hospitals, and preferably only after an initial period of short-
term observation commitment; 
(2) The patient should not be considered as legally in-
competent; 
(3) The patient should be informed of his right to appeal, 
both by the examining physicians and by the hospital; 
(4) The statute which establishes the appeal process should 
be essentially the same as a well-drawn statute which governs 
initial judicial commitment. 
As a final note on ex parte commitment, conversations with 
a number of psychiatrists and mental hospital administrators 
have revealed that most of them are under the impression that 
the Draft Act provides for ex parte commitment on the certificate 
of two physicians, as an alternative to the judicial commitment 
found in section 9. The source of this misconception is the am-
biguous wording of section 6-A. This section provides that a 
mentally ill individual may be admitted to a hospital on the 
certificate of two doctors. This section authorizes admission, not 
commitment. The section provides for what is usually called 
"non-protested admission," but fails to provide expressly that 
admission depends on acquiescence, rather than compulsion. Part 
B of section 6 and the commentary to the act make it clear that 
compulsion can not be used unless the procedure is also an 
emergency situation. 66 Misunderstanding would be avoided if the 
effect of a protest were expressly stated, as it is in most states 
with similar statutes.67 
66 Draft Act, at 24. 
67 For example, California Welfare and Institutions Code (Deering, 1952; Supp. 1957) 
§§6610.1 to 6610.4. 
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2. The Constitutional Problem.68 A fairly recent constitutional 
development is the principle that in certain cases due process 
requires no more than one opportunity to be heard, and if the 
the full hearing is available at some stage, preliminary action 
need not meet any formal requirements. Most of the cases in the 
United States Supreme Court have involved the taking of property 
without a hearing. Thus when a condemnation statute contains 
an adequate provision for payment of compensation without un-
reasonable delay, the taking may precede the compensation.69 
The taking may be contested by an appeal de nova or by allowing 
the owner to sue the government in a separate action and either 
kind of proceeding will justify the prior administrative seizure. 
In a recent case the court indicated that the due process clause 
will be satisfied where property is seized prior to the judicial 
hearing, even though the burden of proof in the hearing is placed 
upon the owner.70 
The Supreme Court cases have concerned the taking of prop-
erty rather than liberty, and it is not clear just how far the court 
would go in upholding the deprivation of a person's liberty by 
an order which did not follow a hearing, where adequate review 
was provided for at a later date. In the Falbo case the Court held 
that a selective service registrant could be punished for failing 
to report for induction, even though the induction order may 
have been invalid.71 In this case the Court indicated that some 
liberty could be curtailed by administrative order, and the proper 
remedy for the registrant was to report to the induction center 
and at that point contest the order in a court. 
The principle has been extended to commitment cases by 
the state courts, and ex parte commitment for an indefinite time 
has been upheld where the patient could obtain a full hearing 
reasonably soon after commitment. 
It is clear that if ex parte commitment is to be sustained, the 
68 There is very little ,writing on the constitutional aspects of ex parte commitment. 
In spite of its title, the article "Constitutionality of Nonjudicial Confinement,'' 3 STAN. 
L. REv. 109 (1950) is concerned solely with commitment after a hearing before an ad-
ministrative or quasi-judicial agency. 
69 Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203 (1945); Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106 
(1934); Am. Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932); Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 
271 U.S. 40 (1926); Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925); Braton v. Chandler, 260 
U.S. 110 (1922); Hays v. Seattle, 251 U.S. 233 (1920); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919); 
Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). 
70 Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 357 U.S. 197 at 210-212 (1958). 
71 Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944). 
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statutes must furnish adequate procedures by which the patient 
may test his detention after he is admitted. Habeas corpus is not 
always adequate because some states use it to test only the legality 
of the original detention and do not inquire into the mental 
illness of the petitioner at the time the writ is requested. However, 
most states now provide by statute for a full judicial hearing on 
request of a patient to determine present mental illness, or by 
statute have enlarged the habeas corpus proceeding so that it 
performs the same function. The two leading cases which uphold 
summary commitment both emphasized that any due process 
defects in the original commitment would be cured only by an 
unlimited right to full review by habeas corpus or other proceed-
ing in the nature of an appeal.72 A number of other states are 
in accord,73 although there are some courts which have held 
otherwise.74 Most of these latter decisions can be distinguished 
on the ground that adequate review procedures were not available. 
The conflicting views are illustrated by the two most recent 
decisions. In both cases adequate review procedures were provided, 
and yet the courts reached opposite results, in both cases by a 
unanimous bench. In Hiatt v. Soucek75 the Iowa court held that 
indeterminate ex parte commitment was valid, even though the 
statute failed to provide expressly for an appeal. The court con-
ceded that if habeas corpus was limited, as it was at common law, 
to testing the legality of the original detention, the commitment 
would be unconstitutional. However, the court held that the 
Iowa habeas corpus statute was broad enough to permit a deter-
mination of whether the plaintiff is in fact a proper subject for 
72 In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897); In re Crosswell, 28 R.I. 137, 
66 A. 55 (1907). 
73 Payne v. Arkebauer, 190 Ark. 614, 80 S.W. (2d) 76 (1935); In re Mast, 217 Ind. 28, 
25 N.E. (2d) 1003 (1940); In re Bryant, 214 La. 573, 38 S. (2d) 245 (1948). 
74 Barry v. Hall, (D.C. D.C. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 222. See Rivers v. Munson, (D.C. Cir. 
1941) 125 F. (2d) 393. The Barry case is the most recent one in which a court flatly states 
that the Dowdell and Crosswell cases, note 72 supra, were wrongly decided, and that an 
ultimate hearing was not sufficient to avoid due process defects. The Barry case may be 
distinguished on the grounds that the federal habeas corpus statute does not afford a 
complete rehearing. Also, the statement was dictum, as the statute involved was not a 
commitment statute. One court has indicated that although indeterminate commitment 
on an ex parte order might be defective, detention for a limited time is permitted without 
a hearing. In re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 A. 1078 (1909). A later case held in effect that if 
adequate appeals provisions are provided, indeterminate commitment is in reality only 
provisional, and due process would ,not require an initial hearing. In re Cornell, 111 Vt. 
525, 18 A. (2d) 304 (1941). 
75 240 Iowa 300, 36 N.W. (2d) 432 (1949). 
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detention.76 The Missouri Supreme Court reached a contrary 
result on the constitutional issue in State ex rel. Fuller v. Mul-
linax77 where it was held that the release provisions of the Draft 
Act, no matter how adequate, could not cure the defects inherent 
in summary commitment. Apparently, the court was bound by 
earlier Missouri cases which held that a defect in commitment is 
not cured by a right to full review by habeas corpus. 
In conclusion, the majority of cases have held that summary 
commitment is valid and that the due process of law is satisfied 
where an adequate appeal provision is included. An additional 
point is that this principle can not be extended to allow summary 
action which involves serious irreparable injury. Corporal pun-
ishment, for example, once inflicted can not be undone and no 
appeal could cure the lack of an initial hearing. Thus a statute 
which permits ex parte commitment and provides that the patient 
becomes legally incompetent and a guardian can be appointed 
for his estate without notice to him is probably unconstitutional. 
"Whether commitment to a mental hospital is such 'irrepar-
able injury' depends largely on the point of view. A court 
imbued with the feeling that commitment of a person to a 
' "lunatic asylum" stamps him with the stigma of insanity, and 
degrades him in public estimation,' may well refuse to allow 
such serious action to be taken without first giving him his 
day in court. A different result might be expected from a 
court which sees no logical or scientific basis for differentiat-
ing mental from physical ills so far as the propriety or need of 
hospital care is concerned, which does not regard a scientific 
examination by experts as a 'summary' procedure or as less 
likely than a judicial verdict to reflect a correct result on a 
question of this kind, and which is convinced of the psychi-
atric wisdom and sound public policy of sparing the mentally 
ill from the harmful effects of formal judicial notice and 
hearing insofar as it is safe to do so."78 
76 Iowa Code (1958) §229.37 ,provides: "All persons confined as insane shall be entitled 
to the benefit of the writ of :habeas corpus, and the question of insanity shall be decided 
at the hearing." The Draft Act contains a provision (§22) which preserves the right of 
habeas corpus, without indicating whether the court can inquire into the present justifica-
tion for detention, as in Iowa, or is limited ,to the propriety of the original commitment. 
South Carolina, which has adopted most of the Draft Act, including §22, has recently 
held that the reference to .habeas corpus in the commitment statute did not impliedly 
repeal the common law rule that the issue of the petitioner's present sanity could not be 
determined in a habeas corpus action. Douglas v. Hall, 229 S.C. 550, 93 S.E. (2d) 891 (1956). 
77 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W. (2d) 72 (1954). 
78 Weihofen and Overholser, "Commitment of the Mentally ID," 24 TEX. L. REv. 
307 at 347 (1947). 
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IV. THE MEDICAL AND LEGAL R.!GH.TS OF THE COMMITTED PATIENT 
The first part of this article has been devoted to the procedures 
for admission or commitment. Post-admission provisions are also 
important and are frequently incorporated in the commitment 
statutes. After the patient is admitted to the hospital, his principal 
concern is the quality of psychiatric care which he will receive. 
This, of course, is a medical problem beyond the scope of this 
paper. It is important to note, however, the various statutory 
provisions which affect the legal status of the patient during his 
hospitalization. Some of these statutes involve limits on the 
patient's exercise of his normal civil rights and others are more 
directly concerned with the medical treatment which he receives. 
Some of these provisions apply only to the short-term patient, 
while others apply to all mental patients. The patient's right to 
release or to contest the need for compulsory hospitalization is one 
of the most important of his rights. Release procedures have been 
discussed as part of the commitment procedure, and are therefore 
excluded from this section. 
In some of the more recent mental health codes, provisions 
which affect the civil and medical rights of the patient are grouped 
together in a single chapter or section entitled "Patients' Rights 
and Care" or "Rights of the Mental Patient." Part IV of the Draft 
Act, "Provisions Applicable to Patients Generally,"79 has been 
referred to by one author as a "Patients' Bill of Rights."80 Similar 
codifications of the patients' rights are found in the 1946 Louisi-
ana Mental Health Law,81 the 1951 Pennsylvania Mental Health 
Act,82 and the 1957 Texas Mental Health Code.83 
While in principle the enumeration of patients' rights may 
be objectionable as impinging upon the executive authority of 
the hospital, in practice they probably do not interfere with 
orderly administration, and in the main reflect the present stand-
ards of care in our better-run mental hospitals. The author's 
Commentary to the Draft Act states: "Some of the individual 
rights specified would seem to be necessarily implied from the 
function of a mental hospital. The creation of a sympathetic 
79 Draft Act, §§19-26. 
80 GUITMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 314 (1952). 
81 La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 28, §171. 
82 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 50, §§1481-1484. 
83 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1958) arts. 5547-68 to 5547-87. 
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public attitude toward the operation of this Act will, however, 
be facilitated by express provisions guaranteeing such rights."84 
A. The Relationship Between Commitment and Legal Capacity* 
The terms "capacity" or "competency" refer to the ability of 
a person to perform acts which the legal order will recognize as 
effective. Although there are special restrictions applied to aliens 
and those who have been convicted of crimes, the general rule 
is that all adults are treated alike in their capacity to make deeds, 
contracts, gifts, etc. 85 The principal exception to the rule involves 
those who are considered legally incompetent by reason of mental 
illness. The usual statement of this exception is that legal trans-
actions will be ineffective if the individual did not have sufficient 
mental capacity to understand the nature and effect of the par-
ticular transaction. The rule is easy to state but difficult to apply, 
partly because of the difficulty of determining the fact of in-
competency, and partly because the law must strike a balance 
between the interests of incompetents and the interests of business-
men and others who deal with them. The courts are generally 
agreed that where an individual has been adjudicated incompe-
tent by a court, and a guardian appointed, the legal acts of the 
individual are void. The courts will usually not inquire whether 
the individual was in fact mentally incompetent as long as he 
is under an active guardianship. The more frequent and much 
more difficult problems arise where the individual is not under 
guardianship, but where other evidence, including evidence of 
hospitalization as a mental patient, is introduced in a suit to set 
aside a deed, contract, will, etc. 
The prospective patient, his family and friends, are apt to be 
concerned with the legal effect of hospitalization on his compe-
84 Draft Act, at 34. 
• The problem of legal capacity in contract law is discussed in a special student 
study, "Mental Illness and the Law of Contracts," p. 1020 infra.-Ed. 
85 Most of the cases involve the capacity of a person to make a deed, contract or will, 
but ·the problem of mental incompetency is coming up in other contexts with increasing 
frequency. Thus mental incompetency of a parent may justify the adoption of the child 
without consent of the parent. Nebstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill. (2d) 511, 121 N.E. (2d) 781 (1954). 
A person who is incompetent can not bring a divorce action, either in person or by his 
guardian [Shenk v. Shenk, 100 Ohio App. 32, 135 N.E. (2d) 436 (1954)], but can bring 
a separation action in person [Sengstack v. Sengstack, 4 N.Y. (2d) 502, 151 N.E. (2d) 887 
(1958)]. S,ee also on the divorce problem: Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 279 S.W. (2d) 
71 (1955). On mental incompetency as a defense to a divorce action, see HARPER, PROBLEMS 
OF THE FAMILY 706 (1952). 
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tency. The problem is of special concern to the borderline patient 
who is admitted at an early stage of his illness. Does the fact of 
admission mean that he is deprived of the power to perform legally 
effective acts? Unfortunately, the law on this subject is confused 
and uncertain, and both courts and legislatures have had difficulty 
in determining the relationship between hospitalization and 
competency. The difficulties have been caused primarily by three 
factors: 
(1) The traditional rules of incompetency are phrased in 
terms of one conclusion (incompetency) following from another 
conclusion (insanity), rather than from a specific set of facts; i.e., 
the rules say, "If a person is insane, he cannot serve on a jury, 
vote, make a deed or will, etc." rather than, "If a person is a 
patient in a mental hospital, he cannot vote, etc." The basic 
source of confusion is the use of a dual terminology. In the older 
statutes and cases, the same term "insanity" was used indiscrimi-
nately to mean the condition which justified the loss of legal 
capacity and the prerequisite for admission to a mental hospital. 
(2) A factor which has tended to perpetuate the confusion is 
that commitment procedures are almost entirely statutory. Misled 
by the indiscriminate terminology, legislative draftsmen have 
generally failed to think the problems through and have occasion-
ally introduced conflicting rules on the legal effect of hospitaliza-
tion. On the whole, the courts have been able to work out the 
policy factors quite well, but all too frequently they have been 
handicapped by poorly drafted legislation. 
(3) Most courts and legislatures have failed to recognize that 
there are two separate aspects to the problem of the relation 
between hospitalization and incompetency. The first problem is 
one of administrative control over the patient, i.e., how far can 
the hospital authorities go in denying the patient his normal 
legal rights. The second problem is essentially one of evidence. 
What is the value of evidence of hospitalization as a mental 
patient in a later proceeding to appoint a guardian or to avoid 
a deed, contract, or will? Is the evidence conclusive proof of the 
patient's lack of capacity? Prima fade evidence? Of some slight 
value? Or inadmissible and of no value? 
Before considering in detail the relation between commitment 
and incompetency, it is helpful to outline briefly the effect of 
guardianship on incompetency. The two areas are analogous, 
partly because the policy problems are similar, and partly because 
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in many states commitment results in some form of guardianship. 
I. Guardianship and Incompetency. The simplest problem is 
the one where the individual is incompetent in fact. The legal 
effects of incompetency are generally clear cut in any given juris-
diction and the existence of a court decree of commitment or 
guardianship does not change the result. Generally, a contract 
or conveyance made by an incompetent is voidable at his option. 
The rules on avoidance, and the policy justifications, are the same 
as those which allow the minor to disaffirm. Both the minor and 
the incompetent are liable 'in quasi-contract for necessaries, and 
this common law rule has been carried into the Uniform Sales 
Act.86 The one area where the incompetent has been treated with 
less leniency than the minor is in the requirement of restitution. 
In most jurisdictions the infant can disaffirm although he is unable 
to restore the status quo, but the contract will bind the incompe-
tent if he is unable to make restitution and the other party 
to the transaction dealt with him without knowledge of his 
incompetency. 87 
A problem which is less frequent, but much more difficult 
for the law to handle, is the effect of deeds or contracts by a 
person who is under guardianship, but who may be competent 
in fact at the time of the transaction. The legal results can be 
summarized as follows: 
(1) A substantial group of courts hold that the appointment 
of a guardian is an in rem proceeding which gives constructive 
notice to the whole world of the incompetency of the ward, and 
that this status continues until the guardian is discharged. 
(2) Probably a numerical majority have concluded that ap-
pointment of a guardian is conclusive on the issue of incompetency 
only at the time of the appointment, and a contract made by the 
ward at a later date is valid if he is in fact competent.88 
These are the policy arguments: 
(1) Favoring the rule that guardianship is conclusive on in-
competency. The guardian, and the court which appointed him, 
86 Uniform Sales Act, §2. 
87 The cases are cited and analyzed in Virtue, "Restitution from the Mentally Infirm," 
26 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 132 (1951). 
88 See annotations in 7 A.L;R. 568 (1920), supplemented in 68 AL.R. 1309 (1930). A 
careful reading of the cases shows that in most of the cases which hold that the appoint-
ment of a guardian is conclusive, the statement is dictum, because the third party had 
actual knowledge of the appointment of the guardian. 
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are primarily charged with the responsibility for protecting the 
property of the ward. This duty would be rendered very difficult 
if the ward were left free to convey away property or make 
contracts which could be enforced against his property, and the 
issue of incompetency in fact were to be relitigated in each action. 
(2) Favoring the rule that guardianship is not conclusive on 
incompetency. If a person is in fact competent, the third person 
who deals with him in good faith and is unaware of the fact of 
guardianship ought to be protected. Realistically, the "construc-
tive notice" that is given the world of business by the court decree 
of guardianship is no notice at all, since most states do not main-
tain central records of guardianship decrees, and it is very possible 
for a person to be adjudicated incompetent in one county and 
have his business or property in another county. 
There are several methods by which the competing policy 
claims can be compromised. One method is reflected in a line of 
cases from Ohio which hold that the appointment of a guardian 
is conclusive evidence of the ward's incapacity to make a contract 
or conveyance which directly conflicts with the authority of the 
guardian, but as to matters which do not conflict with his au-
thority, the adjudication is not conclusive. Thus the making of 
a will or a contract of marriage would be valid if the ward were 
in fact competent.89 Another method is to extend protection by 
statute to specific groups or individuals who are apt to deal with 
incompetents at a distance, and who would be unlikely to dis-
cover the fact of guardianship. Thus several recent corporation 
code revisions provide that a corporation and its stock transfer 
agent are protected if they permit a stockholder of record to 
exercise voting or ownership rights, unless the corporation has 
actual notice of a court decree of incompetency or guardianship.90 
The Ohio statute goes so far as to protect the corporation regard-
less of any actual notice. 
2. The Case Law. As most of the problems concerning the 
legal status of the patient after commitment are not dealt with by 
statute, investigation seems most easily handled by first analyzing 
the existing common law background, and then attempting to 
89 Jordon v. Dickinson, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprints 147 (Superior Court 1887); Lee v. 
Stephens, (Ohio App. 1942) 50 N.E. (2d) 622. 
90 E.g., 1953 Wisconsin Corporation Code (Wis. Stat. §180.851), 1955 Ohio Corporation 
Code (Ohio Rev. Code §1701.28). 
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determine how far the common law has been modified by the 
various statutes. 
On the question of how far the hospital administrator can 
go in denying a patient the exercise of his normal legal rights, 
there are very few cases, and these tend to favor the patient. The 
view of the courts is well illustrated by three recent New York 
cases. 
In People ex rel. Jacobs v. Worthing91 the court said as dicta 
that the denial by a mental hospital of a patient's right to mail let-
ters to his attorney was an unreasonable and unlawful interference 
with the patient's rights. 
In Hoff v. State92 a general order of the Department of Men-
tal Hygiene provided that every patient had the right to com-
municate· free of censorship with the department, the governor, 
district attorneys, and courts of record. The order further provided 
that all other mail could be forwarded by the superintendent of 
the hospital to the patient's guardian. Hoff, a patient in a state 
hospital, executed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and mailed 
it to his attorney. The superintendent, knowing what the letter 
contained, forwarded it to Hoff's guardian, who apparently sup-
pressed it. After gaining his release, the patient sued the state. 
The court held that the superintendent could not rely on the· 
general order, his act was a tort, and the state was liable for 
damages. 
In re Alexieff's Will involved the question of the legal effect 
of a patient's attempt to exercise a right in violation of a hospital 
regulation. A general order of the Department of Mental Hygiene 
provided that ". . . no patient shall be permitted . . . to make 
a will ... except upon the order of the commissioner or a judge 
of a ... court of record .... " 93 A patient executed a will without 
attempting to gain the required consent. The court held that as-
suming the order were valid, violation of the order did not affect 
the validity of the will. There was evidence that the patient was in 
fact competent, and the will was admitted to probate.94 
On the evidence issue, the courts have ranged from one ex-
91167 Misc. 702, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 630 (1938). 
92 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E. (2d) 671 (1939). 
93 General Order No. IO, printed as a footnote to 34A N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 
1951; Supp. 1958) §34. 
94 94 N.Y.S. (2d) 32 (1949), afid. 277 App. Div. 790, 97 N.Y.S .• (2d) 532 (1950), leave 
to appeal denied, 277 App. Div. 901, 98 N.Y.S. (2d) 582 (1950). 
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treme to the other, saying that evidence of commitment is con-
clusive on the issue of competency, or that it is inadmissible, or 
that its effect is somewhere in between. Handicapped by poorly 
drafted statutes, many courts have, on the whole, failed to look 
at the policy issues involved, so there is a wide divergence of 
holdings and many unfortunate decisions. 
Although the problem of the effect of commitment can arise 
in almost an infinite number of types of proceedings, the courts 
of any one state generally treat all of the cases alike, with the 
sole exception of criminal cases. Even in those states which equate 
hospitalization with incompetency, the universal rule is that 
hospitalization is never conclusive on the issue of criminal re-
sponsibility. The courts which have passed on the problem fre-
quently talk in terms of the time lag. The argument is that 
although a defendant may be judicially committed, and then, 
before discharge, commit a crime, the time interval between the 
judgment and the act is great enough so that the defendant 
might have recovered his sanity, and therefore he cannot be 
conclusively presumed to be insane. However, in the one case 
where the time interval was cut down to seconds, and the ink 
on the commitment papers was literally still wet at the time of 
the criminal act, the California court had no real difficulty in 
upholding the conviction. 95 
A minority of states hold, even in the absence of clear-cut 
statutory directions, that commitment is conclusive evidence of 
incompetency. These decisions are generally characterized by 
rigid and mechanistic application of principles without any real 
understanding of the policy problems involved. The courts tend 
to reason that insanity means commitment and insanity also 
means incompetency, so that commitment automatically results 
in total legal incompetency. Typical of this inflexible failure to 
differentiate between the policy issues bearing on hospitalization 
and those bearing on competency is the Colorado case of Rohrer 
v. Darrow.96 In 1901, Mrs. Rohrer was committed by the Denver 
county court to a private mental hospital. In 1903, she was con-
95 In People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 P. 124 (1907), the defendant was taken 
before the superior court for a commitment hearing. After testimony of physicians that 
Willard was "insane, homicidal, and dangerous" the judge orally adjudged him insane 
and committed him to the state hospital. As the judge began to sign the order of com-
mitment, Willard drew a pistol from his pocket and shot and killed the complaining 
witness. The conviction for murder was sustained. 
96 66 Colo. 463, 182 P. 13 (1919). 
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ditionally released to the custody of her husband. She spent the 
next fourteen years working as a bookkeeper for her husband 
who was a banker and real estate agent. Mrs. Rohrer was a partner 
in some of her husband's enterprises, she purchased and sold land 
in her own name and was a notary public. Apparently through 
some oversight, she never received a formal discharge from the 
mental hospital. In 1917, fourteen years after her . discharge from 
the hospital, she sold a parcel of land to the defendant and shortly 
thereafter sued to rescind the deed on the ground of incompetency. 
There was no evidence of overreaching on the part of the defend-
ant, nor was the purchase price inadequate, and the only evidence 
offered on the issue of incompetency was the commitment of 1901 
and the lack of any discharge. The trial court authorized a com-
promise of the suit and the Colorado Supreme Court reversed on 
the ground that the lack of a hospital discharge was conclusive 
proof of legal incompetency, the deed was absolutely void, and 
no compromise of her rights would be permitted. 
A more recent case which illustrates the same attitude is 
Sanders v. Omohundro,97 an action to compel the buyer under a 
land contract to accept a deed to the property. The buyer ob-
jected that title was defective in that the seller had purchased from 
an illegally appointed guardian. The guardian had been appointed 
by an Arkansas probate court without notice to the ward. Appar-
ently, the only evidence of incompetency was a letter addressed 
"to whom it may concern" stating that the patient was me:p.tally 
ill, was confined in a private mental hospital in Dearborn, Mich-
igan, and was incapable of caring for her person or property. The 
letter was signed by a physician on the hospital staff. The Arkansas 
court affirmed a decree of specific performance in favor of the 
seller, stating that insanity is presumed from the fact of confine-
ment. The court had no comment on the lack of notice to the 
ward, either of the appointment or of the sale, nor did it object 
to the lack of evidence of incompetency. Several other states have 
also adopted the view that commitment is conclusive on the issue 
of legal incompetency.98 
97 204 Ark. 1040, 166 S.W. (2d) 657 (1942). 
98 Cubbison v. Cubbison, 45 Ariz. 14, 40 P. (2d) 86 (1935) (proof that defendant in 
divorce action was committed and then discharged, but not judicially restored to com-
petency is sufficient to vacate a divorce judgment when defendant was not represented by 
a guardian ad !item); Walker v. Graves, 174 Tenn. 336, 125 S.W. (2d) 154 (1939) (four 
years after commitment, general guardian could be appointed for :patient in a mental 
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At the other end of the spectrum, a small minority hold that 
evidence of commitment is not only not conclusive on the issue of 
capacity, but is inadmissible. The two cases which are most fre-
quently cited are Leggate v. Clark99 and Knox v. Haug.100 In the 
Leggate case, a wife sued to set aside a deed executed by her 
on the ground that her husband, who joined in the deed, was 
incompetent. The trial court ruled that the order of a probate 
court committing the husband to a mental hospital was admissible 
and prima facie evidence of incompetency. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Court held that the evidence was inadmissible and ordered 
a new trial on the issue of incompetency, although there was other 
evidence which tended to prove incompetency. In the Knox case, 
a Minnesota decision, the owner of land deeded it to A, was then 
committed to a mental hospital, and while on conditional re-
lease sold the same tract to B. The dispute was between A, the 
first buyer, and B, the second buyer, who was fortunate enough to 
record his deed first. The only evidence of the incompetency of the 
seller was the evidence of commitment. The court affirmed a 
judgment in favor of B, stating that a patient may be sufficiently 
unbalanced to need treatment, but still be competent to dis-
pose of his property. It is interesting to note that although the 
case turned on the sufficiency of the evidence, the Knox case has 
been repeatedly cited by digests, text writers, and other courts 
as holding that the evidence was not admissible, an issue which 
was not before the Minnesota court.101 The position taken in the 
Leggate case has been severely criticized by Professor Wigmore102 
and by a number of courts which have passed on the issue, 103 
hospital without notice to him). See In re Ost, 211 Iowa 1085, 235 N.W. 70 (1931) (court 
stated that it is improbable, if indeed not impossible, for a patient in a mental hospital 
successfully -to force termination of guardianship prior to discharge). 
99 111 Mass. 308 (1873). 
100 48 Minn. 58, 50 N.W. 934 (1892). 
101 Apparently the writers have ,been misled by the court's headnote to the effect that 
commitment is " ••• not evidence of mental incapacity." This is an ambiguous statement 
which could refer ,to either admissibility of evidence or sufficiency of evidence. When the 
Nebraska court was faced with the issue of admissibility, it held that the evidence was 
not admissible, citing the Knox case. Dewey v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6, 55 N.W. 276 (1893). 
The Knox case is cited as standing for inadmissibility and disapproved in Martello v. 
Cagliostro, 122 Misc. 306, 202 N.Y.S. 703 (1924) and Maas v. Territory, 100 Okla. 714, 
63 P. 960 (1901). 
102 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1671 (1940). 
103 For an excellent discussion of the admissibility problem, see Rawson v. Hardy, 
88 Utah 109, 39 P. (2d) 755 (1935) in which ,the court discussed the Leggate case and 
others following it and disapproved of the rule. 
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although it has been adopted by Nebraska and a few other 
jurisdictions.104 
The majority of states have held that evidence of hospitaliza-
tion is both admissible105 and entitled to some weight in proving 
incompetency. The most common expression is that commitment 
results in a rebuttable presumption of incompetency (or is prima 
facie evidence of incompetency) and that a final discharge from 
a mental hospital results in a rebuttable presumption of compe-
tency.106 Weight of evidence is never a clear-cut thing like ad-
missibility, and the courts shift back and forth between the 
language of prima facie evidence and rebuttable presumptions.107 
Some of the states treat the presumption as a true presumption 
and require little or no additional evidence of incompetency. 
There is a more recent and apparently growing trend to consider 
the evidence of hospitalization of less weight. This recent line of 
authority is hard to recognize, because the courts continue to talk 
104 Keely v. Moore, 196 U.S. 38 (1904) (will contest-Supreme Court did not discuss 
admissibility of the fact of the testator's commitment, but did hold that the commitment 
papers were properly excluded, citing the Leggate case with approval); Lewandowski v. 
Zuzak, 305 Ill. 612, 137 N.E. 500 (1922) (will contest-reversed and new trial where 
testator's commitment papers introduced as evidence); Hicks v. State, 165 Ind. 440, 75 N.E. 
641 (1905) (evidence of prior commitment not admissible to impeach witness); Wager v. 
Wagoner, 53 Neb. 511, 73 N.W. 937 (1893); !Dewey v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6, 55 N.W. 276 
(1893) (action to rescind conveyance-commitment evidence inadmissible). But cf. Mitchell 
v. Mitchell, 312 Mass. 165, 43 N.E. (2d) 779 (1942); Skelton v. State, 148 Neb. 30, 26 N.W. 
(2d) 378 (1947). 
105 The commitment is admissible only if it is not too remote in time from the acts 
which are involved in the subsequent incompetency case. The courts generally say that 
the trial courts have a wide discretion in determining the length of time which must 
pass before the evidence .becomes immaterial. Since evidence of commitment is apt to 
seem quite conclusive to a jury, the jury should -be carefully instructed on the weight 
and effect of such evidence. Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 109, 39 P. (2d) 755 (1935) and 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1671 (1940). 
106 One court has held that a final discharge is not necessary to restore the presump-
tion of capacity, and that a conditional release is sufficient. Brewer v. Hunter, (10th Cir. 
1947) 163 F. (2d) 341. 
107 With the exception of criminal cases, most decisions on incompetency are equity 
cases to set aside deeds, wills or contracts, etc., where the court determines both the law 
and the facts. Court cases are especially difficult to analyze in terms of the language of 
presumptions, since there is no sharp distinction between what the court tells the jury 
and what the court bases its decision on. In these cases the term "presumption" may 
have any one or more of the following meanings: (1) as a rule of procedure which changes 
the burden of producing evidence and results in a directed verdict if no contrary evidence 
is produced; (2) as a rule of procedure which results in the issue being put to the trier 
of fact, even where no supporting evidence is introduced; (3) as a permissive inference 
of fact; (4) as a label used in locating the burden of persuasion on a given issue: (5) as 
an authoritative principle or assumption used as a starting point in legal reasoning; 
and (6) as indicating a general policy disposition or attitude on the part of the court. 
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of hospitalization resulting in a presumption. However, the results 
reached by the courts show that either substantial additional 
evidence of incompetency is required to justify a conclusion of 
incapacity, or that very little rebutting evidence is required to 
overcome the presumption. 
An example of this modern trend is Finch v. Goldstein108 
where Finch, a committed resident patient in a mental hospital, 
sold a farm to the defendant, taking back a purchase money mort-
gage. After the sale was made, a guardian was appointed for Finch. 
The guardian sued to foreclose the mortgage. The defendant 
pleaded the incompetency of the grantor and asked for rescission 
of both deed and mortgage and the return of his purchase price. 
The court held that a deed and mortgage made prior to an ad-
judication of incompetency is not void, and that a judicial com-
mitment is not such an adjudication. A number of other states 
are in accord, both on the proposition that evidence of commit-
ment alone is insufficient to justify a finding of incompetency,1°9 
and on the proposition not directly involved in the Finch case, but 
implied in the decision, that the evidence is of slight weight.110 
3. The Statutes. Only a handful of states have attempted to 
work out the problem by statute. Many of the statutes are poorly 
drafted and create as many difficulties as they settle. Most of the 
state statutes which deal with the problem provide in general that 
hospitalization as a voluntary or short-term patient does not 
10s 245 N.Y. 300, 157 N.E. 146 (1927). 
100 Fetterley v. Randall, 92 Cal. App. 411, 268 P. 434 (1928) (evidence that contract 
was made on same day that promisor iwas committed to a mental hospital held insufficient 
to justify finding of incapacity to make contract); Fleming v. Bithell, 56 Idaho 261, 52 
P. (2d) 1099 (1935); Knox v. Haug, 48 Minn. 58, 50 N.W. 934 (1892). 
110 Watson v. Banks, 154 Ark. 396, 243 S.W. 844 (1922); People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 
543, 89 P. 124 (1907); People v. Field, 108 Cal. App. (2d) 496, 238 P. (2d) 1052 (1951); 
Livaudais v. Bynum, 165 La. 890, 116 S. 233 (1928); Vance v. Ellerbee, 150 La. 388, 90 
S. 735 (1922); Quarterman v. Quarterman, 179 Misc. 759, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 737 (1943); Sullivan 
v. Whitney, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 762 (1941); Martello v. Cagliostro, 202 N.Y.S. 703 (1924) (good 
discussion of evidentiary value of commitment); Herr v. Herr, 56 Pa. D. & C. 421 (1946); 
Ryman's Case, 139 Pa. Super. 212, 11 A. (2d) 677 (1940); Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 109, 
39 P. (2d) 755 (1935); and Western State Hospital v. Wininger, 196 Va. 300, 83 S.E. (2d) 
446 (1954). See Topeka Water Supply Co. v. Root, 56 Kan. 187, 42 P. 715 (1895); Fay v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 220 Iowa 628, 263 N.W. 14 (1935). Not only is commitment 
not conclusive proof of incompetency, •but a final discharge from a mental hospital is 
not conclusive proof of competency, so as to justify termination of a guardianship. In 
re Pfeiffer, 10 Wash. (2d) 703, 48 P. (2d) 158 (1941). The converse is also true. A judicial 
order which restores competency and terminates a guardianship does not per se require 
that the committed ward be discharged from a mental hospital. In re Zanetti, 34 Cal. 
(2d) 136, 208 P. (2d) 657 (1949). 
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involve loss of capacity, and either remain silent or specifically 
provide that long-term patients do lose their legal capacity. 
The Draft Act has attempted to give express recognition to 
the difference between hospitalization and the status of legal 
incompetency. One of the fundamental principles of the act is 
that a patient who needs hospitalization is not necessarily legally 
incompetent, and a person who is legally incompetent does not 
necessarily require hospitalization. The preface to the act states: 
"A statute having to do with the mentally ill is necessarily 
one which deals with individuals who as a class are peculiarly 
in need of the protective forces of society; public provision 
of hospital care for the mentally ill generally is itself a recog-
nition of this need. Decision as to hospitalization in the in-
dividual case, however, is one which as a rule needs to be 
made in the light of the individual's entire situation, includ-
ing the availability of alternatives which may be sufficient 
or preferable, even from the medical point of view, in the 
particular case. In those cases in which a guardian of the 
person has previously been appointed, the guardian should 
be helpful and will have a more or less authoritative role, 
depending on the law of the State, in arriving at decisions 
in the interest of the sick individual. Appointment of a guard-
ian by the court may frequently be a desirable first step in 
meeting problems growing out of the individual's mental con-
dition of which his need for hospitalization may be only one. 
"The Act, however, does not deal with guardianship as 
such, nor does it make the status of incompetency a prerequi-
site to, or a consequence of, hospitalization .... [I]t is desirable 
that jurisdiction for both types of proceedings should be in 
the same court. . . . Procedurally, however, the determina-
tion that hospitalization is justified should be separated from 
the adjudication of incompetency and the appointment of a 
guardian. It is a fundamental theory of the Act that an order 
of hospitalization decides no more than the question of hos-
pitalization. "111 
Specifically, section 21 of the Draft Act provides: 
"(a) Subject to the general rules and regulations of the hos-
pital and except to the extent that the head of the hospital 
determines that it is necessary for the medical welfare of the 
patient to impose restrictions, every patient shall be 
entitled ... 
111 Draft Act, p. 2. 
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" (3) to exercise all civil rights, including the right to dis-
pose of property, execute instruments, make purchases, enter 
contractual relationships, and vote, unless he has been adjudi-
cated incompetent and has not been restored to legal capacity. 
* * * 
"(c) Any limitations imposed by the head of the hospital on 
the exercise of these rights by the patient and the reasons for 
such limitations shall be made a part of the clinical record 
of the patient." 
Looking at the preface, the commentary, and the act as a 
whole, several conclusions are apparent: 
(1) It is clear that hospitalization under the act does not 
result in total loss of legal capacity. 
(2) It is also clear that the act does not guarantee the patient 
the full exercise of his normal legal rights. The commentary to the 
act mistakenly concludes that the act does guarantee the full 
enjoyment of personal rights and that the loss of such rights can 
result only from a guardianship proceeding.112 This conclusion is 
incorrect, as limitations may be imposed by the hospital. How-
ever, the patient is protected against abuse by the requirement 
that the limitations must be either by general rule or regulation, 
or be incorporated in his clinical record. Thus the act apparently 
leaves open the question of how far the hospital may go in deny-
ing the patient the exercise of his civil rights, and also the ques-
tion raised in the Alexieff case,113 on the validity of the patient's 
exercise of his rights contrary to the restrictions imposed on him 
by the hospital. 
(3) The Draft Act does not settle the evidence problem. It 
would seem that the act does indicate a legislative policy which 
requires that evidence of hospitalization is not conclusive and 
ent~tled to slight weight in a proceeding where legal capacity is 
an issue. 
To date, of the six states which have adopted the Draft Act,114 
four have adopted the Draft Act provision on civil rights.115 South 
Carolina adopted section 21 of the act, which contains a general 
112 Id. at 35. 
113 Alexieff's Will, note 94 supra. 
114 Idaho, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah. For citations, 
see Appendix I infra. 
115 Idaho, Missouri, New Mexico, Utah. 
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enumeration of patients' rights, but omitted sub-paragraph (a) 
(3) which is the civil rights part of section 21.116 
The lineup of the 49 states is given in the last section of 
Tables 2 and 4 in Appendix I infra. The tables are only partly 
accurate. Where there is no e~press statute on the subject, but 
where there are references to the appointment of a guardian 
in the commitment process, or where the statute indicates that 
a discharge from the hospital will restore capacity, the state is 
listed as merging commitment and capacity. Where there is no 
statute or case law on the capacity of patients, the state is listed 
as not merging commitment and capacity, although a court might 
so hold. 
The statutes of some of the states which have accorded express 
legislative recognition to the problem are summarized or quoted 
as follows: 
(1) The states which go the farthest in separating commit-
ment and capacity are Delaware and North Carolina. "Commit-
ment . . . shall not raise any presumption against the sanity of 
the person ... committed."117 
(2) Wisconsin has enacted what is probably the majority rule 
at common law. "Hospitalization under this chapter ... is not an 
adjudication of legal incompetency, but merely raises a rebuttable 
or disputable presumption of incompetency while the patient is 
under the jurisdiction of the hospital authorities."118 
(3) Illinois and Texas are unique in that the court is re-
quired to consider the issue of competency, and has the alterna-
tive of committing as competent or incompetent.119 
(4) In New York, the statute is silent on the evidence prob-
lem, although it seems to imply that hospitalization results in 
incompetency. However, the New York courts have generally 
considered evidence of commitment of slight weight in a sub-
sequent case involving incompetency.120 On the issue of ad-
116 S.C. Code (Supp. 1958) §32,950.12. A later section implies that all patients lose 
legal capacity. "The regular discharge of any person shall ipso facto restore to him all 
his legal rights." §32-950.28. 
117Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 16, §5126. Accord, N. C. Gen. Stat. (1958 repl.) §122-46. 
118 Wis. Stat. (1957) §51.005(2). 
119 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 91½, §§1-8, 1-9; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1958) art. 
5547-51. 
120 See the New York cases cited in notes 108 and 110 supra. 
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ministrative control over the patient, the statutes contain de-
tailed provisions. The Mental Hygiene Law authorizes the hos-
pital superintendent to act in a limited way as a guardian for 
any patient who has no guardian. The superintendent may 
receive up to $1,000 on behalf of the patient, deposit funds in 
a bank or invest in United States bonds, and may execute checks, 
receipts or other documents for the patient.121 In addition, Gen-
eral Order Number 10 of the Department of Mental Hygiene 
provides that no patient may accept service of process or execute 
a will, conveyance, or contract without an order of a court of 
record, except that patients may cash or endorse checks of less, 
than $100 with the permission of the superintendent.122 
(5) Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and Oklahoma expressly pro-
vide in general terms that patients who are hospitalized for an 
indeterminate period are incompetent. 
(6) One of the most specific statutes is that of Ohio: 
" ... no patient in a hospital . . . or a patient on trial visit 
therefrom, shall be competent to enter into any agreement 
or execute a contract, deed, or other instrument unless it has 
been approved and allowed by the court committing him by 
an order entered on the journal of said court. A certified 
copy of such order of the court shall be attached to such 
contract, deed or instrument. 
"The discharge of a patient shall not operate as a dis-
charge of a legally appointed guardian of the person or estate 
of such patient."123 
In the Seabold case, the Ohio court held that a marriage con-
tracted in Ohio by a patient on convalescent leave from an Ohio 
mental hospital would be void, as an "agreement, contract, 
deed or other instrument" prohibited by the statute, but a 
marriage contracted outside of Ohio was valid if the patient was 
competent in fact.124 
4. Summary. It seems clear that none of the statutes dis-
cussed above adequately handles the problem of control by the 
hospital over the patient's affairs. As a practical matter, the hos-
12134A N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1958) §34(14). 
122 General Order No. 10 is printed as a footnote to 34A N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKin-
ney, 1951; Supp. 1958) §34. See also text at notes 93 and 94. 
123 Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5123.57. 
124 Seabold v. Seabold, 84 Ohio App. 83 (1948). See also 1956 Ohio Atty. Gen. Op. 
#7106, p. 656. 
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pital will have to exercise a substantial degree of control. On 
the other hand, most authorities would agree that it is unwise 
to equate hospitalization with complete loss of competency. Prob-
ably the Draft Act and New York provisions are the best avail-
able, as they recognize the need for control but provide some 
safeguards for the patient. 
Only three of the statutes spell out in specific terms the 
answer to the evidence problem. On policy grounds it seems 
clear that evidence of hospitalization should not be treated as 
conclusive proof of incapacity. A sound argument can be made 
for the view that the evidence should be admissible and should 
be entitled at least to the status of a presumption which entitles 
the party who produces the evidence to get to the jury. Psychi-
atric examinations are rare enough in criminal cases and, except 
in a few states, are almost unheard of in civil cases, so that fre-
quently the evidence of hospitalization is the only evidence avail-
able to the party who alleges incompetency. On the other hand, 
if too much weight is attached to such evidence, it will discour-
age patients from seeking early psychiatric assistance. Another 
factor is the increased use of out-patient clinics, conditional re-
lease, psychiatric social case work, and other recent procedures 
which involve short periods of hospitalization and frequent dis-
charge and re-entry, rather than a single period of long-term 
custodial care. A change in legal status every few weeks would 
be psychologically harmful to these "in and out" patients, and 
would produce uncertainty of the law and of legal transactions. 
In any event, it seems clear that hospitalization should not result 
in a conclusive or even a very strong presumption of incompe-
tency. Even formal commitment is a relatively summary process 
compared with the usual guardianship proceeding, and each 
procedure may involve medical and social questions which are 
not relevant to the other proceeding. 
My own conclusions are as follows: 
(I) The problem is one which ought to be handled by statute. 
(2) The Wisconsin statute is probably the best answer to 
the evidence question, but it should be modified so that the pre-
sumption of incompetency applies only to the patient in the 
hospital, and not to the patient on convalescent leave. 
(3) The committing court should be required to consider 
the problem of incompetency and the need for guardianship, 
as the courts of Illinois and Texas are required to, with the 
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help of a social case work investigation as in Minnesota, or with 
the advice of a disinterested attorney, as in Oklahoma. 
(4) The statutes should extend maximum protection to in-
nocent third parties who deal with incompetents or those who 
might be incompetent, whether they are hospitalized or under 
guardianship. There are two methods, both of which could be 
used. First, extend specific protection to classes of third parties 
who are likely to deal with the incompetent at a distance, and 
without knowledge of any facts which might indicate incom-
petency. The recent corporation codes of Wisconsin and Ohio 
are examples of this type of statute, 125 and the same principle 
should apply to banks and insurance companies, as well as stock 
transfer agents and securities brokers. Secondly, the guardian-
ship laws should be amended so as to lessen the possibility of 
an innocent third party dealing directly with a person under 
guardianship. Specifically, the statutes should provide for a court 
decree transferring title to the ward's realty to the guardian, 
which decree could be recorded in every county where the realty 
is located. The same statute would provide that in the absence 
of such recording, the good faith buyer from the ward would 
get good title. 
B. The Patient's Right to Communication 
While in theory the patient's right to unrestricted communi-
cation is a part of his general civil rights, to be protected or not 
under the cases and statutes discussed above, in fact, this specific 
right and a few others have been treated separately in detailed 
statutes. The right of communication was the first right to receive 
recognition and is the only right which is guaranteed by the 
statutes of most states. 
Some of the early legislation was enacted as a result of the 
"anti-railroading" crusade of Mrs. E. P. W. Packard, a movement 
which attracted wide popular and legislative support in the 
1860's and 1870's. Mrs. Packard was the commitment victim of 
her husband's conspiracy. She differed publicly with her hus-
band, an Illinois preacher, on religious issues. He won the argu-
ment by committing her under a convenient and obviously un-
constitutional statute which provided that a married woman 
125 See text at note 90. 
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could be committed on the petition of her husband "without the 
evidence of insanity or distraction required in other cases."126 
On her release, she began a vigorous and highly vocal campaign 
to prevent unwarranted commitment. She was responsible for 
the adoption in a number of states of the mandatory jury trial, 
state inspection of private hospitals, and other legal safeguards 
against "railroading," although she failed to persuade Congress 
to guarantee the postal rights of mental patients. It is generally 
agreed that her objective of obtaining legal safeguards against 
the abuse of commitment proceedings was a worthy one. It is 
unfortunate that her principal means used was the mandatory 
jury trial involving a public trial whether the patient wants it or 
not.121 
Although a few modern statutes appear to recognize that a 
patient's rights of communication are worth protecting as such, 
most statutes clearly indicate that these rights are ancillary to 
the right to release. The power of the hospital to supervise or 
deny the patient visitation or postal rights may be misused as 
a means of holding the patient incommunicado. An example of 
the abuse which is possible even in a modern state mental hospi-
tal is found in the recent case of People ex rel. Jacobs v. 
Worthing.128 Jacobs was held in a New York state hospital for 
four years. During all this time he sought release on a writ of 
habeas corpus. The hospital regulations denied the patient the 
right to correspond with his attorney or with any attorney, and 
the hospital rigidly enforced the prohibition. After four years, 
he finally succeeded in getting in touch with an attorney by 
smuggled mail. The Supreme Court stated that the evidence 
overwhelmingly favored his release and then severely castigated 
the hospital for its unreason~ble restraint of his rights. 
The older statutes authorize the patient to designate a cor-
respondent outside of the hospital. Mail addressed to the cor-
respondent must be forwarded without examination.129 The more 
126 Ill. Laws (1851) p. 98. 
127 The Packard case and its impact on state legislation is reviewed in a detailed 
article, Dewey, "Lunacy Legislation in Illinois," 69 AM. J. INSANITY 751 (1912). See also 
DEt.rrsCH, THE MENTALLY lu. IN AMERICA 423 (1946). 
128 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 630, 167 Misc. 702 (1938). See also the Hoff case, discussed in the 
text at note 92. 
129 Fla. Stat. (1957) §§394.3 to 394.17; Mont. Rev. Code (1954) §§38-112 to 38-116; 
N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §25-0211; S.D. Code (1939) §30.0124. 
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recent statutes extend the privilege of mail without censorship 
to and from a selected class of persons or public officials. The 
Draft Act provision is typical. Section 21 provides that subject 
to the general rules of the hospital, and except to the extent 
that restrictions are deemed necessary for the patient's wel-
fare, the patient shall be entitled "to communicate by sealed 
mail or otherwise with persons, including official agencies, inside 
or outside the hospital; to receive visitors .... "130 An additional 
paragraph provides that: "Notwithstanding any limitations au-
thorized under this section on the right of communication, every 
patient shall be entitled to communicate by sealed mail with 
the (central administration) and with the court, if any, which 
ordered his hospitalization."131 
Thus the act creates qualified privileges of correspondence and 
visitation. The rights may be restricted by a general rule of the 
hospital, or by an order of the hospital administrator, which 
must be entered in the patient's records. The act also creates an 
absolute right to communicate with the central state mental 
health agency and the committing court. Criminal penalties are 
provided for a denial of the patient's rights.132 All of the six states 
which have adopted the Draft Act have adopted its provision on 
the right of communication.133 A number of other states provide 
for a similar absolute privilege of correspondence with designated 
officials or persons.134 The Draft Act and most of the other statutes 
180 Draft Act, §21. 
131Ibid. 
132 Id., §26. 
133 Idaho Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §66-346 (same as (Draft Act, except no absolute 
right oto write state department of mental health); Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, Supp. 1958) 
§202.847 (same as Draft Act); N.M. Stat. (1953) §34-2-15 (same as Draft Act); Okla. Stat. 
(Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §93 (substantially same as Draft Act); S.C. Code (Supp. 1958) 
§32-950.12 (same as Draft Act); Utah Code Ann. (1953) §64-7-48 (same as Draft Act). 
184 Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code Ann. (Deering, 1952) §7502 (no censorship of mail of 
patient in state hospital to superior judge or district attorney); m. Rev. Stat. (1957) 
c. 91½, §9-8 (no censorship of mail ,to governor, attorney general, court of record, state 
attorney, dept. of public welfare or any attorney); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §76-1222 
(no censorship of mail to dept. social welfare); La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 28, §171 (no 
censorship of mail to state dept. institutions or attorney); .Me. Laws Rev. Stat. (1954) 
c. 27, §100 (no censorship of mail to •the state dept. institutions); Md. Code Ann. (1957) 
art. 59, §35 (no censorship of mail to one correspondent or dept. mental hygiene); Mass. 
Laws Ann. (1957) c. 123, §98 (no censorship of mail •to dept. mental health); Minn. Stat. 
(1957) §253.11 (no censorship of mail to governor, public welfare dept., or one cor-
respondent); N.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 135, §33 (no censorship of mail to trustees of state 
institutions); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 50, §1481 (no censorship of mail to 
governor, dept. of welfare, court or attorney); R.I. Gen. Laws (1956) §26-3-20 (no censor-
ship of mail to dept. public welfare); Wis. Stat. (1957) §51.35 (no censorship of mail 
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appear to be unduly restrictive in that the absolute privilege 
applies only to mail to public officials. The New York court, in 
the Jacobs case discussed above, pointed out that public officials 
may be unable or unwilling to act, and that the patient's attorney 
should be included. The New York Department of Mental Hy-
giene, after being severely criticized in the ]acobs135 and Hoff36 
cases, both of which involved denial of mail privileges in habeas 
corpus proceedings, changed its regulation. The present regula-
tion is detailed and complete and would be an ideal model for 
a state which wishes to incorporate the communication privilege 
in its statutes. The regulation creates a qualified privilege as to 
all mail and an absolute privilege relative to officials, attorneys, 
and habeas corpus pleadings.137 
A few states have adopted a qualified privilege statute, pro-
viding that mail privileges may be restricted under certain speci-
fied conditions.138 A number of states have similar statutes on 
the rights of visitation.139 In only two states does the patient have 
an absolute statutory privilege of writing to anyone without 
censorship.140 
C. Freedom From Publicity 
As long as mental illness carries with it a stigma which does 
not attach to other forms of disease, patients should receive legis-
lative protection against possible social disgrace resulting from 
publicity. The problem is especially important to the borderline 
patient in an early stage of mental illness. The natural reluctance 
of the patient's physician and family to expose "private family 
troubles" in a court room open to the public often causes postpone-
ment of early treatment. The result is that many who could have 
of patient in public hospital to governor, attorney general, dept. of public welfare, 
district attorney, court, or attorney) and §58.05 (no censorship of mail of patient in private 
hospital to dept. of public welfare). 
135 See text at note 91. 
136 See text at note 92. 
137N.Y. Codes, Rules and Regs. (4th Supp. 1949), Dept. of Mental Hygiene General 
Order No. 11. 
138 Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code Ann. (Deering, 1952) §5751; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1958) 
§§83-314, 83-315. 
131! Conn. Gen. Stat. (1958) §17-189; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) -tit. 28, §171; Mass. Laws 
Ann. (1957) c. 123, §99; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) ,tit. 50, §1481; Vt. Stat. Ann. (1959) 
tit. 18, §2512. 
140 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1958) §17-190 (censorship of mail prohibited); Iowa Code (1958) 
§§226.13, 229.39 (patient allowed to write once a week "what he pleases" to any person). 
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benefited by prompt treatment are not hospitalized until their 
condition is incurable. 
There are two aspects to the problem-protection of the 
hospital record and protection of the judicial record. The hospital 
record and the records of physicians or health officers who partic-
ipate in the commitment process are generally kept confidential 
in the absence of legislation and in accordance with medical 
ethics. The judicial record, however, is traditionally considered 
a public record and in the absence of express legislation the 
hearing, if any, and the resulting records are available to all. 
Court records may be kept confidential both to protect the persons 
involved in the commitment process from the patient, and to 
protect the patient from adverse publicity. Experience under 
recent Wisconsin statutes is a good example of both policy factors 
at work. Judicial records involving all patients were made con-
fidential in 1947.141 Subsequent to 1947, in two cases, released 
mental patients assaulted those who had petitioned for their 
commitment. In each case, it was discovered that the patients 
had been in hospitals where trusted patients were allowed to 
assist the staff in administrative duties and thus had access to 
patient files. By this means, word got back to the patients as to 
the names of those who had petitioned for their commitment.142 
On the request of the Board of County Judges the problem was 
dealt with by the 1953 legislature. The present statute provides 
that when the county judge fonvards copies of the commitment 
records to the hospital, the names of the petitioners must be 
deleted.143 
The Draft Act provides that judicial hearings may be held 
in a non-public session in the discretion of the court.144 A number 
of states have similar provisions.145 Possible constitutional diffi-
culties would be avoided if the statute expressly stated that the 
patient may require that the hearing be public. The Draft Act 
also makes confidential the records of courts, health officers, and 
hospitals involved in the commitment process. The act provides: 
141 WIS. Laws (1947) c. 485. 
142 Letter to the author, dated July 1, 1954, from the Hon. George Kroncke, Jr., 
County Judge, Dane County, Wisconsin. 
143 Wis. Stat. (1957) §51.06(2) and §51.30. 
144 Draft Act, §9(f). 
145 E.g., Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1958) art. 5547-49; Wis. Stat. (1957) §51.02(2). 
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"Section 23; Disclosure of Information.-
"(a) All certificates, applications, records and reports made 
for the purpose of this Act and directly or indirectly identify-
ing a patient or former patient or an individual whose hos-
pitalization has been sought under this Act shall be kept 
confidential and shall not be disclosed by any person except 
insofar 
"(l) as the individual identified or his legal guardian, if any 
(or, if he is a minor, his parent or legal guardian), shall con-
sent, or 
"(2) as disclosure may be necessary to carry out any of the 
provisions of this Act, or 
"(3) as a court may direct upon its determination that dis-
closure is necessary for the conduct of proceedings before 
it and that failure to make such disclosure would be contrary 
to the public interest. 
"(b) Nothing in this section shall preclude disclosure, upon 
proper inquiry, of any information as to his current medical 
condition, to any members of the family of a patient or to his 
relatives or friends. 
"(c) Any person violating any provision of this section shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not more 
than $500 and imprisonment for not more than 1 year." 
The Draft Act provision has been adopted in five states146 
and somewhat similar provisions exist in five other states.147 
An interesting side-light on the problem is afforded by a 
recent action of th.e Idaho legislature. Idaho adopted section 23 
of the Draft Act in 1951. In 1953, the statute was amended to 
provide: "Nothing in this section shall preclude disclosure upon 
proper inquiry, of any information contained in such ... reports 
... to abstractors, title insurance companies in connection with 
title matters relating to title to real property in which the patient 
has or had some interest, lawyers .... "148 While at first glance 
it might seem that the legislature had misconstrued one of the 
basic purposes of the Draft Act, i.e., the complete separation of 
hospitalization and incompetency proceedings, nevertheless this 
146 Idaho Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §66-348; Mo. Stat. Ann. §202.853 [repealed, Laws 
1957, p. 672, §1]; N.M. Stat. (Supp. 1957) §34-2-17; S.C. Code (Supp. 1958) §32-950.14; 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) §64-7-50. 
147 ID. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 91¼, §4-5; Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §218.22; 34A N .Y. Consol. 
Laws (McKinney, 1951) §§20, 34(9); Wash. Rev. Code (1953) §71.02.250; Wis. Stat. (1957) 
§51.30. 
148 Idaho Laws (1953) c. 264, §4, Idaho Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §66-348. 
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amendment reflects a real problem. If a patient who is a resident 
in a mental hospital is preparing to sell land, the buyer will 
certainly know about the fact of hospitalization and might require 
the appointment of a guardian or a judicial declaration of compe-
tency. However, where the patient is not a resident in a hospital, 
but on conditional release, the prospective purchaser would have 
a legitimate interest in inquiring of the hospital as to the seller's 
current status. The Idaho exception is too broadly stated, as it 
is difficult to see how the abstractor has any real interest. It should 
also be noted that the amendment does not require disclosure; 
it merely exempts the hospital authorities from criminal sanctions 
for making disclosure. Another apparent defect in drafting is that 
while title companies must be concerned with title, there is no 
such qualification for abstractors and attorneys. Possibly a better 
solution would be to require the central state authority ( depart-
ment of mental health), which keeps a roster of all patients, to 
answer questions from attorneys and title insurance companies 
as to whether or not an individual named in the request is carried 
on the books of any mental hospital in the state, his current status 
(resident or conditional release), and how long he has been a 
patient. 
D. The Patient and His Medical Rights 
I. In General. A few writers have discussed briefly the topic 
of proper medical care and the patient's right to such care. One 
author has used the term "medical due process."149 The problem 
is one which by its very nature cannot be solved by passing a 
law. The principal barriers to effective treatment are inadequate 
financing, an acute shortage of hospital beds and equipment, 150 
in some states a poorly designed administrative structure for 
the state hospital system, 151 and most of all, lack of trained 
personnel.152 
The Draft Act and the more modern commitment codes in-
directly secure some elements of proper medical care by eliminat-
149 Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 at 1203 (1947). 
150 The U.S. Public Health Service estimates that in 1950, 725,000 hospital beds 
were needed for mental patients. Only 462,000 beds were available, and 63,000 of these 
were sub-standard. Felix, "Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill," 107 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
712, n. 78 (1951). See also REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE 134. 
151 REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE 70. 
152 Id. at 149. 
1002 MICHIGAN LAw R.Evmw [ Vol. 57 
ing admission procedures which are harmful to the patient. More 
directly, section 19 of the act lists as one of the patient's "rights": 
"Every patient shall be entitled to humane care and treatment 
and, to the extent that facilities, equipment, and personnel 
are available, to medical care and treatment in accordance 
with the highest standards accepted in medical practice."153 
In addition, the act imposes on the hospital a duty to examine 
each patient at least once every six months.154 As already indicated, 
adequate personnel and equipment do not exist today and could 
not be created overnight, even if funds were available. The Draft 
Act provisions for the best medical care are relatively meaningless 
at the present time and are little more than pious expressions 
of hope. Section 19 is a statement of an ideal and certainly does 
no harm, but it might better be included as a general policy 
expression at the beginning of the act.155 To date, provisions 
similar to section 19 have been adopted by eight states, either 
as general policy statements or as part of the "rights of patients" 
chapter in the commitment statute.156 
In addition to the general provisions on medical care, there 
are two specific aspects of treatment which have received separate 
legislative attention. One of these involves legal control over the 
degree of mechanical restraint which may be imposed, and the 
other involves legal control over the use of major and potentially 
dangerous methods of treatment, such as surgery or shock therapy. 
2. Regulation of Restraint. Of the many controversies in the 
psychiatric profession during the last half of the nineteenth 
century, none was more heated than the question of "restraint" 
versus "non-restraint."157 Eventually the advocates of non-restraint 
carried the field and their ideas were written into the laws of a 
number of states. Despite adverse publicity, the use of mechanical 
restraints still plays an important role in our mental hospitals and 
153 Draft Act, §19. 
164 Id., §15. 
155 This has been done in Oklahoma. Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §2. 
156 Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code Ann. (Deering, 1952) §6621; Idaho Code Ann. (Supp. 
1957) §66-344; Iowa Code (1958) §225.15; Mo. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1958) §202-840; N.M. 
Stat. (1953) §34-2-13; Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §§2, 91; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann (Vernon, 
1958) art. 5547-70; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §64-7-46. 
157 The restraint controversy and the arguments on both sides is treated in detail 
in DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY !LL IN AMERICA, c. XI (1946). 
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will probably continue to do so as long as they are seriously under-
staffed.158 The Draft Act and ten of the states provide for statutory 
controls on the use of restraints.159 All of these require in sub-
stance that mechanical restraints may be used only when pre-
scribed for individual patients as medically necessary, thus at-
tempting to discourage the improvident use of restraints by ward 
attendants. In addition, the Draft Act and most of the states re-
quire that a report of the restraint and the reasons for its use be 
incorporated in the clinical record of the patient. In addition to 
statutory controls, many states have administrative regulations on 
the use of restraints. Perhaps the best of these is the recent and 
carefully-drafted New York provision.160 
3. Legal Control of Potentially Dangerous Treatment. The 
administrators of mental hospitals are faced with the difficult 
problem of how far they can go in administering serious or major 
treatments which may involve some danger to the patient. Sur-
prisingly, the issue has received little or no attention in legal or 
medical literature. 
The legal rules relating to surgery in a non-mental hospital are 
fairly well defined.161 Except in the case of an extreme emergency, 
the physician may not operate without consent. An unauthorized 
operation is a technical assault and makes the physician liable 
in damages. The required consent must be given by the patient 
or, if he is a minor, by his parents or guardian. The administration 
of the rule presents very few problems, as the patient is almost 
always willing to consent or, if he is a minor, the parents are will-
ing to consent and are immediately available to give their consent. 
Serious difficulties, however, are presented by the special char-
acteristics of the mental hospital and its patients. The hospital 
administrators work on the assumption that the consent of the 
158 Current practices regarding the use of restraints are summarized in REPORT TO 
THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE 100, 303, and 354. 
159 Draft Act, §20; Idaho Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §66-345; Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949) 
§76-1223; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1959) §203.240; Mass. Laws Ann. (1957) c. 123, §§35-38; Mo. Stat. 
Ann. (Vernon, Supp. 1958) §202.843; N.M. Stat. (1953) §34-2-14; Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957) 
tit. 43A, §92; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 50, §1481.1; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 
1958) art. 5547-71; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §64-7-47. 
160 The regulation is substantially the same as the Draft Act provision, except that 
means of restraint and maximum periods of restraint are limited. N.Y. Code, Rules and 
Regs. (5th Supp. 1949) Dept. Mental Hygiene General Order No. 7. 
161 See cases collected in Horr AND Horr, LAW OF HOSPITAL, PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 
168 (1947). 
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patient is of no value, since a court might hold that he is mentally 
incapable of giving effective consent. Most patients in the state 
hospitals are public charges. Having no estate, most of them have 
no guardian who could give consent. Many patients become 
estranged from their families and, in addition, many patients are 
hospitalized away frotn their own communities. Thus the hos-
pital may have a great deal of difficulty in locating the relatives 
and convincing them to grant consent. Some of these cases are 
covered by the emergency exception to the consent rule. How-
ever, the emergency doctrine has been strictly limited by some 
courts to cases where the operation is immediately necessary to 
save the patient's life.162 
Some hospital administrators contend that the provisions for 
treatment of a committed patient in a public mental hospital may 
be distinguished from the legal rules governing patients in medical 
hospitals. The argument is that mentally ill persons are con-
sidered wards of the state. The state as parens patriae must pro-
vide necessary care and treatment. The care and treatment of 
mental patients is a governmental function and the basic con-
sideration in the exercise of this function is the patient's welfare, 
not what the patient or his relatives believe to be in his interests. 
Thus, consent is not legally required for the patient in a public 
mental hospital. Although there are no cases squarely in point on 
the issue of surgery without consent, there is one attorney gen-
eral's opinion. Basing his conclusion on the above arguments, the 
Vermont Attorney General concluded that the state mental hos-
pital performed a governmental function in treating patients and: 
". . . it is my belief that you may administer in your own 
sound discretion such treatment [including surgery] . . . 
as is indicated after diagnoses as being necessary or proper 
for his welfare. As to the matter of securing the consent of 
the inmate's relatives, it is my belief that such is not necessary 
as a matter of law, but where it can be obtained, it is my 
feeling that such a course is one to be commended."163 
· The Vermont conclusion is buttressed by th~ language of 
most commitment statutes to the effect that patients are committed 
"to the state hospital for care and treatm'ent"164 or that the state 
162Id. at 176; REGAN, DocroR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW, 2d ed., §11 (1949). 
163 Vt. Atty. Gen. R.ep. 207-208 (1944-1946). 
164 E.g., Draft Act, §5. 
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hospital has "exclusive custody and control of all patients."165 
A few states have specifically dealt with the problem by statute. 
Illinois is the only state which apparently provides that surgery 
may be used in all non-emergency cases without consent. The 
statute provides that the various forms of admission, including 
voluntary and non-protested admission and emergency and formal 
commitment "shall constitute the authority for the Superintendent 
... for giving such standard treatment including surgery as may 
be necessary for the welfare of the patient, or of the public."166 
The statute applies to all mental hospitals, including private 
hospitals, a fact which might cause constitutional objections. It 
might be held that the doctrine of parens patricte could not be 
stretched to authorize a private hospital to operate without con-
sent. On the other hand, it could be argued that the care of all 
of the mentally ill is essentially a governmental function and that 
the superintendent of a private mental hospital is in effect a 
state or quasi-state agent in the exercise of this function. A similar 
Iowa statute applies to the state psychopathic hospital only. The 
statute authorizes the physician in charge to ". . . proceed with 
such observation, medical or surgical treatment, and hospital care 
as in his judgment are proper and necessary."167 
Ohio and Oklahoma have almost identical statutes which 
provide that except in emergency cases, the hospital may not 
perform a major operation until the hospital notifies the guardian 
or relative of the patient, if such information is in the patient's 
records.168 Note that the statute requires notice rather than con-
sent. Under a literal interpretation of the statute, the hospital 
could notify the relatives and then disregard a protest. 
The Draft Act does not cover the problem of consent to 
surgery nor do the statutes of any of the other states, although 
almost every state has some general provision giving the hospital 
authority to both detain and care for the patient. These provisions 
165 E.g., Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §95; N.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) §17-33; Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) §64-7-9. 
166 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 91½, §§4-8, 5-18, 6-3. 
167 Iowa Code (1958) §225.15. No such provision exists for the regular state mental 
.hospital. But see id., §226.6(1). The 1957 Texas Mental Health Act has a provision similar 
to Iowa Code §225.15; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1958) art. 5547-70. Sterilization and 
prefrontal lobotomy is specifically prohibited unless consent is given by a guardian. Tex. 
Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, Supp. 1958) art. 3174b-2. 
168 Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5123.03; Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §96. 
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could be liberally interpreted to allow the hospital to treat with-
out consent. 
The statutes discussed above all relate to the problem · of 
surgery. In recent years, another problem has plagued mental 
hospital administrators: the legality of the use without consent 
of major types of non-surgical treatments. Specifically, these treat-
ments are the shock and fever therapies. The electro-shock treat-
ment has been widely adopted since it was introduced into this 
country from Italy in 1939, and is the most widely used of the 
shock therapies. The treatment results in the patient losing con-
sciousness and experiencing convulsions and violent muscular con-
tractions. Although fractures were common when the therapy 
was first used, the present incidence of complications is less than 
one percent. The effectiveness of the treatment is now well recog-
nized for certain mental disorders, especially the manic-depressive 
psychoses. Some state hospitals do not use such special therapies 
without the consent of the relatives. It is felt that the treatments 
are sufficiently dangerous that the rules of consent which apply to 
operations should be applied here. Other hospitals do not require 
consent, although they do make some effort to obtain it. There 
are no cases or statutes which specifically cover the point, although 
the Illinois statute discussed above is probably broad enough 
to include shock therapy. The only detailed discussions of the 
medical and legal aspects of the problem are contained in two 
1948 attorney general opinions, one from Pennsylvania and one 
from Wisconsin. Both opinions conclude that neither voluntary 
nor committed patients in a state hospital, nor their relatives 
or guardians, have any control over the type of treatment used. 
Under its police power, the state may advance the medical and 
psychiatric welfare of a patient by means of electric shock or 
other well-recognized therapies, including prefrontal lobotomy, 
without first obtaining consent.169 
E. Conclusions 
Primarily for historical reasons, our hospitalization statutes 
have stressed the procedural problems involved in getting the 
169 Pa. Ops. Atty. Gen. 120 (1948); Wis. Ops. Atty. Gen. 502 (1948). See also Ohio 
Ops. Atty. Gen. No. 7106, p. 656 (1956), which holds that a patient admitted under a 
short term ex parte commitment can be given only emergency treatment, unless valid 
consent is present. 
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mental patient into a hospital, and have almost completely ignored 
the legal problems which may arise after the patient is admitted. 
On some of the minor details, such as protection of the patient's 
postal rights, or protection against unwarranted mechanical re-
straint, substantial agreement has been reached and is generally 
embodied in legislation. However, on the broader and more 
fundamental problems involving the effect of hospitalization on 
legal capacity and the types of treatment which may be adminis-
tered without consent, there is no general policy agreement and 
most of the statutes are silent. These more basic problems are 
difficult to solve and no ready-made policy determinations are 
presented here. What is important is that the state legislatures 
recognize that there are policy questions to be decided. When the 
nature of the problems are understood, then the psychiatrists, 
hospital administrators, and probate judges can be called in and 
asked to help to provide specific solutions. 
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APPENDIX I 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Table 1. Indeterminate Judicial Commitment-Pre-Hearing Procedures 
Justification for Commitment 
Danger Needs Treatment 
X X 
X X 












































Exam Ordered by Court 








1 citizen and 2 doctors 
2 physicians 
same as Draft Act 
only when application 






















Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949; 
Supp. 1957) c. 59-20, 22 
probate X X 
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. circuit not stated not stated 
202 
La. Stat. Ann. (1950; 
Supp. 1957) tit. 28 
district X 
Mc. Rev. Stat. (1954) municipal board X X 
c. 27, §no of cxaminc11 or 
probate court 
Mass, Laws Ann. (Supp, superior or X X 
1958) c. 123 district 
Mich, Stat, Ann, (Supp, 
1957) §14,811 
probate not stated not stated 
Minn, Stat, (1957) C, probate X 
525 
Miss. Code Ann. (1942; 
Rec, 1953) tit, 4, c, 2 
chancery X X 
and tit. 25, c. 3, 
Mo. Stat. Ann, (Supp, probate X X 
1958) c. 202 
Mont, Rev. Code (Supp, 
1957) tit, 38 and tit. 91 
district X 
Nev. Rev, Stat. (1957) district X 
C, 433 
N, J, Stat, Ann, (Supp, 






N, M, Stat, (1953) C, district X X 
34•2 
34A. N,Y.(") Consol, any coult of X X 
Laws (McKinney, Supp, record 
1958) 
N,D, Rev, Code (Supp. 
1957) tit. 25 






X X X 
X (1) 
X X 
X X X X 
X X 
l X X X 
X X X (1) 
by 2 specially X (1) 
qualified 
physicians 
X X X (1) 
1 pbydclan 
1 physician ( optional) 
2 physicians 
coroner and one physician 
2 physicians 
1 physician and 1 psy• 































Table I, Continued 
Justification for Commitment Application Sup-
Court ported by Medi-
Danger Needs Treatment cal Certificate 
Ohio Rev. Code (Bald- probate X X 
win, Supp. 1958) c, 5123 
Okla, Stat. Ann, (Supp. 
1957) tit, 43a 
county X X 
Ore, Rev. Stat. (1957 probate X X 
Rep!,) tit, 35 
Pa, Stat, Ann, (Purdon, 
1954) tit, so 
common picas X(B) X(B) by 2 physicians 
R,I, Gen, Laws (1956) district or X(') X(') 
tit. 26 supreme court 
S.C. Code (Supp. 1958) probate X X X 
tit, 32 
S,D. Code (1939) 
30; 1953 Laws, p. 187 
tit, (8) not stated not stated 
Tenn, Code Ann, (Supp. 
1957) tit. 33 
probate X X 
Tex, Civ. Stat, Ann, 
(1958) tit, 92 
probate X X X 
Utah Code Ann, (1953; district X X X 
Supp, 1957) tit. 64, c, 7 
Va. Code (Supp. 1957) circuit X X 
tit. 37 corporation or 
trial justice 
Wash. Rev. Code (Supp, 
1955) tit, 71; 1957 Laws 
superior X 
87 
W. Va, Code Ann, (1955; 
Supp, 1958) C, 27 
(10) not stated not stated 
Wis, Stat. (Supp. 1958) county or X 
c. 51 district 
Notice of Hearing 






X X (1) 
X 
X 
X X X 
X X (1) 
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Wyo, Comp, Stat, (Supp, district X X 
Jg57) C, SJ 
Summary: 43 States Probate: J6 Danger: 4 Mandatory: J6 24 J2 
Trial Court: J6 Needs Treatment: s Optional: J 
Trial Court or Either Ground: 28 
Probate: 7 Not Stated: 6 
Administrative 
Agency: 4 
1 Court has discretion 10 omit notice to patient if notice would be meaningless or harmful to patient because of his mental condition, 
2 Court commitment is for 6o days, Court order becomes an order for indeterminate detention on certificate of hospital, 
(1) 2 physicians 
Mandatory: 22 Mandatory: 34 
Discretionary: J2 Discretionary: 3 
•statute refers to "necessary or advisable for him to be under care," but court held that only justification for commitment is danger, Commonwealth v. Noyes, 83 Pa, D, & C, 3u 
(1952), . 
'Commitment statute allows commitment of either group, but discharge statute requires discharge of non-dangerous patient on application for habeas corpus. §26-3.Jo, 
GThcrc arc two types of judicial commitments in Iowa, plus ex partc commitment, The proceedings referred to in the table above and in Table 2 involve a hearing before a quasi• 
judicial agency, the county insanity commission, which consists of an attorney, a physician, and the clerk of court, This procedure is used for commitment to any mental hospital (state, 
county, private or United States veterans' administration) excepting only the psychopathic hospital at the state university medical school, A separate and exclusive procedure is provided for 
the psychopathic hospital, involving a hearing with optional jury before the superior or district court, 
0 Thc hearing is held by the panel of two doctors who make a personal examination and also hear witnesses, The court commits the patient if it approves the findings of the panel, 
7 Court may also appoint one psychologist and may appoint welfare agency to make a social case study investigation, 
8Thc hearing is held by the mental health board, a quasi-judicial agency with judicial powers (immunity, subpoena, etc,), consisting of the county judge, one attorney, and one 
physician, 
•Notice to patient may be dispensed with if notice would be harmful and If guardian ad !item appointed, 





















0 ..... ..... 
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Table 2. Indeterminate Judicial Commitment-Hearing Procedures 












































Docs Commitment Automatically Result in 
Incompetency? 
no-except that restrictions may be imposed 
for medical reasons 
no-except that guardian can be appointed 
for committed patient without notice to him 
[§36-214(E)] 
yes-(Laws, 1957, c. 164) 
(5) 
no 
no-but public guardian may be appointed 
without notice to patient 
mandatory(8) I yes 
no 
yes(•) 
mandatory reference to I yes-commitment and guardianship arc one 
panel of a physicians and proceeding 
1 attorney. Commitment 
is by court 
optional-referee I same as Draft Act 
optional reference to I committing court must designate patient as 
panel of two physicians competent or incompetent 
yes(') 
yes 
optional reference to I yes-guardian may be appointed In commit• 
panel of two physicians _m_en_t_o_r_d_er ____________ _ 
yes-but no provision for automatic guard• 
ianship 
optional reference to I no 



















Massachusetts (8) X 
Michigan X X 
Minnesota X 
Mississippi X 
Missouri X X X 
Montana X X 
Nevada X 
New Jersey X X discretionary 
with court 
New Mexico X X X 
New York(') (1) X 
North Dakota X X compensated 
Ohio X 
Oklahoma X X 
Oregon X X X 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island X compensated 
South Carolina X X X 
South Dakota X X 
Tennessee X 
Texas X X X (11) 
• The 11umbers In parentheses refer to the notes following this table. 
hearing may be held by 
commissioner or clerk 
optional 
optional 





testimony may be taken 
before panel of 2 physi-
cians and I attorney 
testimony may be taken 
before 3 commissioners . 
no 
no 
yes-public guardian appointed for every 
committed patient 
no 
yes-guardian may be appointed for patient 
without notice to him 
same as Draft Act 
yes-guardian may be appointed as part of 
commitment procedure 
no-but committing court shall appoint guard-
ian on application of any interested person 
no 
no-Draft Act provision 
yes-by administrative order No. 10 
no-Draft Act provision 
yes 
yes-guardian appointed by committing court 





no-but committing court Is required 


























Mandatory Hearing Right To Be Represented 
by Counsel 
Utah X X 
Virginia X X 
Washington X X 
West Virginia X X 
Wisconsin X X 
Wyoming X 
Summary Not stated: 1 25 
43 States Mandatory: 38 
If asked for: 4 
Table 2, Continued 
Court-Appointed Jury Trial Reference to Hearing 
Counsel Commission 
optional with court optional-referee 
hearing held by panel of 
judge and 2 physicians 
X 
compensated 
optional X expressly forbidden 
X 
21 Mandatory: 2 
Discretion 
of court: 2 
If demanded: n 
Docs Commitment Automatically Result in 
Incompctcncy1 
no-Draft Act provision 
no 
yes 
yes-guardian appointed for every committed 
patient 
no-results in rcbuttable presumption of in• 
competency 
yes-guardian appointed in commitment pro-
ceeding 
No: 23 
Yes (in whole or part): 18 









1 Hearing required if a friend or relative of patient demands it, r 
•court order is for 6o-day commitment. Order becomes an indeterminate commitment on certificate of hospital, <I 
8Hearing is before commission of two physicians but commitment is by the court. If patient objects to findings of commission, he can demand jury trial, <; 
'Hearing is ex partc, no notice to or presence of patient is required. Use of jury is in discretion of court, not the patient. 
•committing court must designate patient as competent or incompetent, and if incompetent may appoint guardian, Ariz, Rev. Stat, Ann, (Supp, 1958) §§36-514(D), !,j 
6 Judicial commitment and incompetency proceeding arc merged in one action. If court fmds incompetency, it may or may not commit. b:1 
7Commitment is equivalent to adjudication of incompetency and guardian may be appointed at time of commitment, or if guardianship is asked for in subsequent proceeding, fact of < 
continued hospitalization plus physician certificate of incompetency is conclusive on fact of incompetency, §§8-120, ::;: 
8Ky, Op. Atty, Gen, 39, 583 (1957), ,., 
9 No hearing unless requested by patient, ~ 
10 Hearing is before court, but preliminary hearing is held before panel of two physicians and one attorney who make findings as to both incompetency and need for hospitalization, 
11 Jury trial mandatory unless expressly waived by patient or relative and attorney ad !item, 
Table 3. Ex Parte Indeterminate Commitment-Admission Procedures 
Justification for Commitment Patient Informed of 




Draft Act 2 physicians judge or health officer X state mental health X 
Public Health Serv, agency 





jArk. (") Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 physician X 
1957) c. 59•2 
Conn. Gen. Stat. (Rev, 1958) physician, attorney and superior court not stated 
§17.181 one other person 
t Del. (1) Code Ann. 
1956) c. 16-51 
(Supp. 2 physician, not stated 
Fla. Stat. (1957) §394.21 2 physicians county judge X 
Iowa (6) Code (1958) c, :,.:,.7 2 physicians X 
tMd. Code Ann. (1957), art. 59 2 physicians not stated (ll) 
Miss. ~) Code Ann. (1942; Rec. 
1953) 6go9-12 
2 physicians director of state hospital X 
tNcb. Rev. Stat. (1958) 
c. 83(3)(b) 
(8) 
fN.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 135 2 physicians probate judge not stated 
tN.C. (1) Gen. Stat. (1958 rep!.) state hospital(') clerk of superior court X 
c. 122 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 
1957) tit. so 
2 physician, hospital superintendent not stated 
S.C. (1) Code (Supp. 1958) 
§32-912 
2 physicians probate court X 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) 
tit. 64, c. 7 
2 physicians judge or hcalth officer X 
tvt. Stat. Ann. (195g) tit. 18, 2 physicians magistrate X 
c. 61 
Summary: 14 states Danger: 3 
ln 6 states ex partc commitment Needs treatment: 1 
is only method. Either ground: 5 
Not stated: 5 
t In these states, ex partc commitment is the only procedure available for indeterminate commitment. 
1 Ex partc commitment is only to state hospital. 
llCourt test is M'Naghten test (right-wrong) or danger. Salinger v. Supt., 206 Md. 623, 112 A. (2d) 907 (1955). 












8Therc arc two forms of ex partc commitment: by a county board of mental health consisting of attorney, physician, and court clerk; or by two physicians. 
X 
X 
'Initial commitment to state hospital is for 6o-day observation period, made by clerk of court after hearing, Final commitment is made ex partc by clerk on certificate of hospital. 























Table 4. Ex Parte Indeterminate Commitment-Post-Admission Provisions 
Appeal to Right to Be Represented by Court 
Counsel on Appeal 
Appointed Counsel Jury Trial on Appeal 
Draft Act court X X 
Arkansas . 
Connecticut superior court or habeas corpus 
Delaware chancery court mandatory 
Florida county court X compensated 
Iowa district court X X X 
Maryland law courts X 
Mississippi chancery court or habeas corpus 
Nebraska district court or habeas corpus 
New Hampshire superior court 
North Carolina habeas corpus in superior court 
Pennsylvania habeas corpus in superior court 
South Carolina probate court X X 
Utah district court X optional 
Vermont probate court X 
Summary: 14 states 4 3 mandatory: 1 
optional: 3 
• There is no appeal provision, but patient can bring habeas corpus in any court of record. 
Does commitment automatically result in 
incompetency I 
no-except that restrictions may be im-
posed by hospital for medical reasons 
no 
no 
no-and commitment raises no presump• 
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APPENDIX II 
The Judicial Commitment Section of the Draft Act 
Sec. 9. Hospitalization upon court order; judicial procedure. 
1017 
(a) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual may be com-
menced ,by the filing of a written application with the (probate) court by a friend, relative, 
spouse, or guardian of the individual, or by a licensed physician, a health or public 
welfare officer, or the head of any public or private institution in which such individual 
may ,be. Any such application shall be accompanied by a certificate of a licensed physician 
stating that he has examined the individual and is of the opinion that he is mentally ill 
and should be hospitalized, or a written statement by the applicant that the individual 
has refused ,to submit to examination by a licensed physician. 
(b) Upon receipt of an application the court shall give notice thereof to the proposed 
patient, to his legal guardian, if any, and to his spouse, parents, and nearest known 
other relative or friend. If, however, the court has reason -to believe that notice would 
be likely to be injurious to the proposed patient, notice to him may be omitted. 
(c) As soon as practicable after notice of the commencement of proceedings is given 
or it is determined that notice should be omitted, the court shall appoint two desiguated 
examiners to examine the proposed patient and report to the court their findings as to 
the mental condition of the proposed patient and his need for custody, care, or treatment 
in a mental hospital. 
(d) The examination shall be held at a hospital or other medical facility, at the 
home of the proposed patient, or at any other suitable place not likely to have a harmful 
effect on his health. A proposed patient to whom notice of the commencement of pro-
ceedings has .been omitted shall not be required to submit to an examination against his 
will, and on the report of the designated examiners of refusal to submit to an examination 
the court shall give notice to the proposed patient as provided under paragraph (b) of 
this section and order him to submit to such examination. 
(e) If the report of the designated examiners is to the effect that the proposed patient 
is not mentally ill, -the court may without taking any further action terminate the pro-
ceedings and dismiss the application; otherwise, it shall forthwith fix a date for and 
give notice of a hearing to ,be held -not less than 5 nor more than 15 days from receipt 
of the report. 
(f) The proposed patient, the applicant, and all other persons to whom notice is 
required to be given shall be afforded an opportunity to appear at the hearing, to testify, 
and to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the court may in its discretion receive 
the ,testimony of any other person. The proposed patient shall not be required to be 
present, and all persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings shall be excluded, 
except as the court may admit persons having a legitimate interest in the proceedings. 
The hearings shall be conducted in as informal a manner as may be consistent with 
orderly procedure and in a physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect on the 
mental health of the proposed patient. The court shall receive all relevant and material 
evidence which may be offered and shall not be -bound by the rules of evidence. An 
opportunity to be represented by counsel shall be afforded to every proposed patient, 
and if neither he nor others provide counsel, ,the court shall appoint counsel. 
(g) If, upon completion of the hearing and consideration of the record, the court 
finds that the proposed patient 
(1) is mentally ill, and 
(2) because of his illness is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain 
at liberty, or 
(3) is in need of custody, care or treatment in a mental hospital and, because 
of his illness, lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with 
respect to his ·hospitalization, it shall order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period 
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or for a .temporary observational period not exceeding 6 months; otherwise, it shall dis-
miss the proceedings. If the order is for a temporary period the court may at any time 
prior to the expiration of such period, on the basis of report ,by the head of the hospital 
and such further inquiry as it may deem appropriate, order indeterminate hospitalization 
of the patient or dismissal of the proceedings. 
(h) The order of hospitalization shall state whether the individual shall be detained 
for an indeterminate or for a temporary period and if for a temporary •period, then for 
how long. Unless otherwise directed ·by the court, it shall be the responsibility of the 
(local health authority) to assure the carrying out of ,the order within such period as the 
court shall specify. 
(i) The court is authorized to appoint a special commissioner ito assist in the conduct 
of hospitalization proceedings. In any case in which the court refers an application to 
•the commissioner, the commissioner shall promptly cause the proposed patient to be 
examined and on the basis thereof shall either recommend dismissal of •the application or 
hold a hearing as provided in this section and make recommendations to the court regard-
ing the hospitalization of the proposed patient. 
(j) The head of the hospital admitting a patient pursuant to proceedings under this 
section shall forthwith make a report of such admission to the (central administration). 
